

CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1967

VOL. 53, NO. 313

Regardless of the reasons for Western intervention in Asia, the West will be disliked. "The memory of colonial rule is very sharp. . . . The Asian does not feel so divided from his communist enemy as he does from his Western friend." Our introductory article analyzes China's role in Asia; and five subsequent studies evaluate the foreign policies and internal developments of Mainland China.

China in Asia

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A COMMON FALLACY underlies much of the contemporary discussion of China and her problems. Following the doctrine of "containment," it is assumed that China can and rightly should be expected to exist politically within the present frontiers of the People's Republic—even Tibet is called in question—without any claim to further influence. History is almost ignored; geography is barely considered; and the inevitable political consequences are treated as if they were the peculiar evil property of the present government in Peking.

But history and geography cannot be ignored, except at the peril of forming false judgments and formulating unworkable policies. China lies at the heart of eastern Asia; she has had a very long relationship with her neighbors, of peace and war, trade and migration; and these aspects of east Asian history must be taken into consideration.

In ancient times the peoples whom the Chinese called Yueh, a word still familiar in the southern dialect form of "Viet," lived along the whole southeastern coast of China, and probably in the adjacent islands also.

They were seafarers who migrated southward into what is now Vietnam ("Yueh Nan, Southern Yueh," in standard Chinese). Many of the Yueh people remained on the south China coast and in historical times were gradually incorporated into the Chinese empire after the first century B.C. Ethnically, therefore, there is a close affinity between the southern Chinese and the Vietnamese, and this is still evident in their language.

The movement and history of the Yueh people can be compared to the very similar migrations, a thousand years later, of another seafaring people, the Norsemen. They, too, spread along the northwest coasts of Europe and mingled with the peoples inhabiting Britain, Ireland, northwest France, Holland and Scandinavia, their original home. Today the affinity among these modern nations is still conspicuous. So it is also in the Far East, in the lands of the ancient Yueh folk.

After China had absorbed the coastal provinces, there was a long period during which she also ruled over what is now called North Vietnam, then known as Tongking. As time

passed, the distance from the Chinese court of this remote province and the distinctive "Viet, or Yueh," characteristics of its inhabitants made them impatient of Chinese rule. They frequently revolted; finally, in the eleventh century, the Chinese government recognized that the Viet province could be better governed under an autonomous tributary king, who would rule as he pleased in his own country, but would pay more or less nominal allegiance to the ruling Chinese dynasty. This pattern persisted under many changes of regime in Peking down to the French conquest of Vietnam in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Thus the historical relationship between Vietnam and China was first direct Chinese rule, then indirect Chinese suzerainty. The history of Korea offers a similar story, the only difference being that at the end of the nineteenth century it was Japan, rather than a European power, that terminated Chinese suzerainty in Korea and imposed foreign colonial rule.

EARLY RULE IN ASIA

Vietnam was a special case; it adjoins China and ethnic and cultural connections are close. Until French rule was imposed, the Vietnamese wrote in Chinese characters and their literature was a branch of that of China. Their political system was closely modeled on the Chinese monarchy; their ethical system was Confucianism; the popular religion was the Chinese form of Buddhism.

Elsewhere in south Asia the relationship to China was not so close. Cambodia, Laos and Thailand and, beyond these, Burma, derived their original culture from India, and with it, first Brahmanism, then the Theravada branch of Buddhism, which also flourishes in Ceylon. Sanskrit was their sacred classical language, not Chinese. This was also true in Java and Sumatra, until the Muslim conversion of these countries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D.

The rest of Indonesia, the "outer islands," were settled and civilized after the Muslim conversion. In these countries China had only an indirect influence, but it was at times a powerful one. In the earlier centuries,

China seems to have confined her interests to trade and the seasonal visits of merchants. The Mongol conquerors of the Sung Chinese dynasty attempted to extend their direct rule to Vietnam, Burma and also Java. These campaigns were defeated mainly by the tropical climate and the unfamiliar jungle terrain which were unsuited to Mongol cavalry tactics. After these vain attempts, the Mongols, too, contented themselves with suzerainty.

When the Ming Chinese dynasty replaced the Mongols, early in the fifteenth century, they embarked on an extensive program of naval power and overseas expeditions, partly military, partly diplomatic. Large fleets sailed south and imposed Chinese suzerainty in Java, Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Ceylon. Kings who resisted were deposed and more amenable monarchs were substituted. China's fleets ranged across the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and east African coast, but in these distant lands their mission was diplomacy and trade, not conquest. This unique burst of Chinese maritime activity lasted 30 years, and was brought to an end by changes of policy at home, not by resistance abroad from either the southeast Asia peoples or outside powers. It was 70 years and more before Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

China has therefore had a long history of relations with the peoples of southeast Asia; in later centuries the relationship took on a new form—the massive immigration of Chinese into these countries. This had begun as early as the twelfth century but became large-scale only when the colonial rule of European powers had developed the markets and created the need for labor in these regions. Today, it is the presence of large Chinese communities in southeast Asia, usually in control of important sections of the economy, that constitutes the "Chinese problem" for the states which have succeeded the colonial powers. That it also creates a relationship with China, which could be uneasy and might be dangerous, is evident. Recent events in Indonesia illustrate this point.

The strength of China in the lands beyond

her southern frontier and beyond the South China Sea is thus a compound of historical relationships, demographic factors and geographical propinquity; only to a lesser degree is it based on cultural influence and immediate political or military power. China will always be in the area and has always been there; sometimes active, sometimes disinterested or too troubled at home to exercise her latent strength, she has been a factor never to be discounted, certain to reappear.

These considerations impel a highly intelligent ruler like Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia to steer a careful course through present strife and to seek, if possible, a recognized and respected neutrality. His problem and that of his neighbors is how far to equate Chinese influence, which must always be present, with communist ideology, which may not remain the dominant force in China or, if it remains, may take new and unexpected forms. This, indeed, is the problem which all nations involved in east Asia must consider and resolve if their policies are to prove effective in the long run.

CHINA'S AIMS

The question, what are the policy aims of the present Chinese government in this part of the world, is complicated by the prior question, whether there is only one Chinese policy, or two; a Chinese national policy and a communist policy, which may run in harness part of the way, but may diverge at other points. As far as the evidence goes it would suggest that there are in fact two policies, and that they are successive, rather than concurrent. The first, the policy of Chinese national interests, is aimed at a restoration in modern form of the old suzerain-tributary relationship which functioned for so long and, from the Chinese point of view, so well, for many centuries. This seems to the Chinese the "natural" relationship between the major and the minor powers. Minor Asian powers should move in China's orbit, just as the small republics of Central America move in that of the United States, or as the small powers of Western Europe used to conform to the policies of France or Britain.

This Chinese policy would therefore seek to see regimes similar to that of China established in all these countries: ideally, communist; next best, "fellow traveling," as in Burma; also acceptable, nonaligned, or neutral, as in Cambodia. Attachment to the United States by alliance or by offering the use of bases is, to the Chinese, unacceptable.

In the view of the Chinese Communists, there is certainly a further policy beyond or concurrent with this—the promotion by example and encouragement of communist-inspired-and-led revolution in all those countries where and when the time seems ripe. In the view of every communist the time will certainly come because the "contradictions" of the capitalist system will inevitably bring this denouement. The questions are: when, and what, can be done to hasten the day? In one sense, this policy is purely ideological; it postulates the inevitability of communism, but fixes no dates. If it were nothing but an aspiration, the world as a whole would have little need to complain. We have long been accustomed to messianic creeds which promise, or expect, the conversion of the whole world in due course: and we know that the course is very long, if, indeed, it is not infinite.

The urgency and reality of the Chinese Communist policy lie in the fact that in many countries the economic and social systems are so decayed and distorted that some kind of revolutionary change is most probable. Can this change be effected, as the West would like to hope, by aid, protection against communism, and the promotion of democratic forms of government, or must it follow the Chinese model? The Chinese Communists have no doubts; to them, the alternatives are not viable. The possessing class will renounce neither wealth nor power unless compelled by force. Aid can touch only the fringe of the problem, and will be misapplied by corrupt rulers; foreign protection (or occupation as they see it) will only arouse the national feelings of the peasants and make them see the foreign power as the protector of their landlords and corrupt rulers. Thus there is a practical communist expectancy of results ob-

tainable in measurable time, as well as a more distant truly ideological hope that "one day" all the world will be converted to communism. Clearly, the Chinese national policy of restoring China's primacy in her former tributaries, and the communist policy of promoting revolution in the same countries can and do go a long way together.

POLICY AND POSSIBILITIES

Policy is one thing; possibility is another. Very few great policies have been fully realized. After a century, the Monroe Doctrine has still left several parts of the American continents in allegiance to foreign, non-American powers. The Crusades failed to destroy the Muslim religion, or even to hold the Holy Land. Islam failed to conquer Europe. More recently, the European powers, who seemed even 30 years ago so secure in their colonial empires in Asia and in Africa, have lost virtually all these countries and no longer expect or wish to recover them.

There is no historical reason to suppose that communism has a magic which Christianity and Islam lacked, or that China has or will have the power to impose lasting rule over alien peoples when all previous examples have proved how transitory such power is. The conflict of Russia and China in their interpretation of communism also shows, as should have been expected, that an ideological creed is always subject to the dangers of heresy, controversy and doctrinal dispute, and that these divisions frequently coincide with ethnic and cultural differences which make them irreconcilable. Thus there are very real obstacles in the path of Chinese policy, but these lie more in the way of the communist ideological policy than in that of the national policy aimed to secure Chinese national interests.

The ideal of worldwide communist revolution already seems utopian. The first question is: which form of communism is to win the victory, the Russian, or that of Chairman Mao Tse-tung? Until this internal dispute is resolved there can be no unity of purpose or certainty of operation. And there is at

present no sign at all that the dispute can be composed; rather it grows sharper. This in effect means that the ideological policy of the Chinese Communists must now be subordinated to the policy of Chinese national interests. China cannot convert Russia, nor can she win the East European Communist countries to her side. They are willing enough to use the dispute to gain influence and free themselves from too close a Russian control, but this does not mean any disposition to accept the leadership of China instead. The Indonesian revolution of 1965 has shown also that in some of the southeast Asian countries there are factors which militate against Chinese influence and policy. One of these factors is precisely the size and potential power of China herself. Many Indonesians felt that a communist regime would subordinate Indonesian interests to Chinese influence and control. A second factor is the ethnic difference between Chinese and Indonesians, which emphasizes the economic position of the local Chinese and the long-standing communal animosities between the two peoples. In all the Muslim countries these factors are present, and create great obstacles for Chinese policy.

It is, of course, always possible that the now dominant anti-Chinese and anti-communist leadership in these countries will fail to cure their very great social and economic maladies. These leaders do not appear to be making significant progress in either field. If they fail, there will certainly be a revolution in favor of the only alternative, the communists. Whether China can play that hand skillfully, or clumsily, only the event would show. In countries where Islam is not dominant and where the pattern of culture is closer to China—the Buddhist countries of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos—the Chinese model is more potent and the fact that all of them either adjoin China or are separated from her territory only by narrow strips of thinly populated jungle country makes her influence much more direct and her power more positive than it can be across the seas. In theory it is possible for China to invade and occupy all these continental countries

with her present armaments and forces. It is not practical for China to mount any overseas expedition; her forces are not equipped for such an operation. In Australia, this last fact has been largely concealed from the reading public by self-interested politicians ready to exploit popular fears and prejudices, but it is axiomatic and accepted by informed American and European opinion.

LIMITS ON CHINESE POLICY

There are, therefore, physical limits to any forceful application of Chinese policy, be it ideological or national. It is at least very possible that the Chinese also see other limitations that preclude the use of military force to achieve their aims. The Chinese believe that social conditions in the countries near their southern border will soon engender a revolutionary movement. They have only to wait; they see the decline of these economies, the rise of the cost of living, the increasing poverty of the peasants; if not now, they believe that these conditions will inevitably come soon.

That revolution cannot be exported is a firm Chinese Communist doctrine, just as it was the teaching of Lenin. The Chinese have acted on this belief. They did not create the Vietnamese Communist movement, it came into existence and into power in the North some years before the Chinese Communists controlled the adjacent parts of China. It was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who put Ho Chi Minh into power in Hanoi. The Communist Party of Indonesia, whether it really planned to seize power in September, 1965, or only to ride gently into power on the back of President Sukarno, was an Indonesian movement having roots in the 1920's and 1930's and its membership was Indonesian, not Chinese. The Chinese Communists believe that a regime such as that of General Suharto cannot survive, and that it will in turn produce conditions favorable to the resurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party. They also believe that if Aidit and other Indonesian Communist leaders were hoping to win power by "legal" means through the medium of President Sukarno,

they were making a fundamental error in strategy and doctrine. There is no "parliamentary road" to revolution; power must be seized; it "grows from the barrel of a gun." Historical evidence supports this dictum; it is hard to find any regime in the world whose power did not originally come from the barrel of a gun.

The Chinese can count on other advantages in their strategy of waiting. First, they are going to be in the area, however long the wait. Second, overseas powers are subject to the changes of fortune that events elsewhere may dictate. Britain once dominated the Eastern Seas; so, after her, did Japan. The Chinese probably take into account the fact that the United States has worldwide interests, some of which are of far greater importance to the United States than Vietnam could ever be; some change, some crisis, might bring these interests into danger and then the new situation would receive priority, just as Britain was forced out of the Far East by the German threat, and not by local nationalism. This no doubt explains why Chinese words and actions do not match. The words are rough and harsh; the actions are moderate and cautious. The United States is denounced in very strong terms, but China takes great care not to provoke military incidents, and has not reacted violently to such accidental incursions by air as the United States forces have from time to time acknowledged.

There are also the advantages which the Chinese may reap from factors that are not the product of any Chinese policy. The Chinese are an Asian people; as such they have the sympathy and understanding which go with ethnic affinity and cultural relationship. However much the Europeans and Americans are divided among themselves, or from the Russians, they still feel a relationship, a kinship, both of race and culture; so the Asian peoples, especially those of the Far East, feel the same way. The emotional identification is largely indefinable, but very real. The Chinese thus see that the foreign, Western intervener, no matter in what cause he comes, will always be a figure of doubt and dislike to the Asians. The memory of co-

lonial rule is very sharp and very recent. The Asian does not feel so divided from his communist enemy as he does from his Western friend. This is one of the painful facts of international relations which many are unwilling to admit. In this respect, the Chinese have a real advantage; they do not send their troops across the frontiers, they have learned that such action is never popular and often disastrous. They help their friends, but not with armed and visible soldiery.

MILITARY POWER

On the military side, the Chinese may be well advised to act with caution, for in fact they are not so strong as they are often thought to be, and they are aware of this. The progress of Chinese nuclear fission experiments and the detonation of a hydrogen bomb in early June, 1967, should not distract attention from other aspects of Chinese military power. The Chinese do not possess a navy able in any way to challenge the power of the United States; thus they cannot mount any overseas expedition, even against Taiwan. Most Chinese naval craft are built for coastal waters, and are defensive in character. They are designed to frustrate a Nationalist raid from Taiwan rather than to mount an invasion of that island.

The Chinese air force is equally defensive, with very few bombers able to cross the seas around China, and none of great range. The fighter aircraft are short-range, designed for defense against intruders. All Chinese aircraft are relatively obsolescent, because of the quarrel with Russia and the slow process of making the air force independent of Russian prototypes and replacements. Conventional Chinese land forces are very large—although not unduly large for so vast a country and so great a population. The incidence of conscription on a population of 700 million is slight. It is unlikely that most of the Chinese land forces are equipped with weapons as sophisticated as those of the United States; the majority are line regiments and armor is relatively scarce.

In military terms, this means that China's armed forces are geared for defense, not ag-

gression. This, of course, is precisely what the Chinese government always claims is their sole function. Military facts confirm it. In defense, the Chinese would be formidable; their numbers are very great, they know the terrain, and would have the full cooperation of the population. There is every reason to think that any invasion of China, even if accompanied by a heavy air attack, would be a profitless exercise. The bombing of the small target area of North Vietnam has failed to produce the expected results; the bombing of the vast area of continental China could hardly be anything but ineffective.

Only nuclear attack could seriously disrupt Chinese defenses. Nuclear power will not for long be an American and Russian monopoly in the Far East. Estimates vary, but there is no doubt that the pace of China's development of her nuclear armament has outstripped expectations in the West—or at least the expectations which were given to the general public. Therefore, the Chinese have another and compelling reason for present caution. Every passing year brings them nearer to the day when they will be able to retaliate in kind if subjected to nuclear attack. Already nothing short of nuclear attack could destroy their defenses or lead to defeat in war. In another ten years, or perhaps less, they will no longer, as they put it, "be subject to nuclear blackmail by the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R."

It does not follow that, having escaped from that situation themselves, they would at once be ready to put others in the same position. It cannot be assumed that China will be the only nuclear Asian power in 1975. Japan and India may feel it necessary to enter

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"The Mao-Lin-Chou strategy is essentially a cautious strategy . . .," notes this specialist, who points out that nevertheless, "China's leaders [do not] totally rule out the threat of possible war with the United States."

China's Cautious American Policy

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ANY DISCUSSION of Sino-American relations in the last two years will have to focus on the increasing American involvement in Vietnam and Communist Chinese perceptions of this involvement.¹ As far as Sino-American relations are concerned, Vietnam has occupied the central place in all Communist Chinese debates and discussions. It has also occupied a key position in the internal factional disputes of the Cultural Revolution period.²

As the American involvement in Vietnam increased during 1965, China witnessed a serious debate about the extent of American escalation and its possible consequences for China. From February, 1965, to August, 1966, at least two well-defined factions seemed to be developing regarding Chinese perceptions of the Sino-American confrontation in the context of Vietnam. One faction was apparently led by Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing and Peking's Mayor P'eng Chen, joined by President Liu Shao-ch'i in early 1966. This group ex-

pected the United States to escalate the war into China and expressed a desire to render unconditional help to Vietnam with possible Soviet cooperation. By September, 1965, another faction, led by Defense Minister Lin Piao and supported by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, was emphasizing self-reliance for the Vietnamese. This faction tacitly underscored the belief that the war would not escalate into North Vietnam or China, and offered only conditional assistance to Vietnam. With a different degree of emphasis, this was also the view taken by Premier Chou En-lai.

For the sake of clarity, the former faction can be called "interventionists" and the latter, "non-interventionists." The interventionists emphasized that by following the strategy adopted in World War II and by cooperating with the Soviet Union, the United States could be defeated; their opponents stressed the strategy adopted in China's own civil war and in the war of national resistance against the Japanese. Calling for self-reliance on the part of the Vietnamese, the latter offered only as much assistance from China as "international circumstances would permit." By August, 1966, at least in public or in the Chinese press, all debate was over; and the non-interventionists had apparently won the day.

When the United States began the bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965, the Chinese press began to publish a reevaluation of

¹ The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Graduate School of Boston University for research support and to the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong for use of its facilities.

² Many observers feel that the Vietnam conflict has played a very important role in the factional disputes of the Cultural Revolution. Most prominent among these are Franz F. Schurmann and Uri Ra'an. It must be emphasized, however, that there are a number of other highly relevant and crucial issues involved in the current struggle in China unrelated either to Vietnam or to other foreign policy issues.

the Vietnam conflict. In particular, Chinese commentators began to emphasize that the United States had shifted its strategy from "special war" to "limited war" of the Korean type. The Chinese also interpreted the American strategy of "flexible response" to mean gradual escalation from "special war," to "limited war," to "global nuclear war." Among the proponents of this view was Lo Jui-ch'ing who felt that the Vietnamese conflict would certainly be escalated into China.³ In the face of such grave risk, he hinted that the socialist countries might have to intervene in Vietnam. To support his case, he cited what he called the Stalinist strategy of "active defense"; as applied by Stalin in World War II, "active defense" could develop into "strategic offense." Such a strategy would naturally presuppose some form of Soviet co-operation.⁴

³ Lo Jui-ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!" *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 5, May, 1965, in *Selections From China Mainland Magazines*, (hereafter cited as *SCMM*), American Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 469, May 17, 1965, pp. 11-22. A different viewpoint was expressed by the editorial department of *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily)*, of May 9, 1965, in their article "On the Historical Experience of the War Against Fascism." It did not link World War II strategy to the war in Vietnam. For further support of Lo Jui-ch'ing's position see Ch'ang Kung, "The Bankruptcy of the U.S. 'Special War' in South Vietnam," *Shih-chieh Chih-shih (World Knowledge)*, No. 12, June 25, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 481, July 26, 1965, pp. 1-4.

⁴ Lo Jui-ch'ing, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-16.

⁵ See editorial, "The Great Victory of Leninism," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 4, April 30, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 469, May 17, 1965, pp. 1-7; and Commentator, "Drive the U.S. Aggressors out of Vietnam," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 4, April, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 469, May 17, 1965, pp. 7-10.

⁶ See Shih Tung-hsiang, "The Deciding Factor of Victory or Defeat in War Is Man, Not Matter," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 7, June 14, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 477, July 6, 1965, pp. 1-13; Kuo Li-chun, "On Dialectics of Paper Tiger and Real Tiger," *Che-hsueh Yen-chiu (Study of Philosophy)*, No. 3, May 25, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 481, July 26, 1965, pp. 5-21; Ho Lung, "The Democratic Traditions of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 8, July 31, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 483, August 9, 1965, pp. 1-15; Yang Ch'eng-wu, "Seizure of the Luting Bridge," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 9, August 21, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 489, September 13, 1965, pp. 9-17; editorial, "Inherit and Develop the Great Revolutionary Spirit of the Long-March of the Workers and Peasants Red Army," *Ch'ien-hsien (Front)*, Peking, No. 19, October 10, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 572, April 17, 1967, pp. 15-19.

One of the reasons for this evaluation was the growing belief that in the face of the massive land and air involvement of United States forces, the strategy of people's war as practiced by the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front could not win by itself. As explained by Lo Jui-ch'ing, the "South Vietnamese Liberation Army" would face the difficult task of fighting "regular" as well as "guerrilla" wars at the same time. According to the faction led by Lo Jui-ch'ing, the only alternative was counter-escalation through Chinese or Sino-Soviet support.

THE "SELF-RELIANCE" FACTION

During the spring and summer of 1965, other views were expressed by the so-called "people's war" faction. In a series of articles and editorials, this group began to react strongly to Lo Jui-ch'ing's emphasis on the strategy followed in World War II. Asserting that the United States would neither escalate nor get out of Vietnam, they stressed that the fate of Vietnam was really in the hands of the Vietnamese. The support for the National Liberation Front expressed by this faction was always conditional and the main emphasis was on self-reliance.⁵ Emphasizing China's own civil war and the war of national resistance, and pointing to Chinese traditions, advocates of this position minimized the importance of outside assistance.⁶

In spite of this debate and the uncertainty of Chinese policy towards United States involvement in Vietnam, throughout 1965 great emphasis was placed on preparedness for war in China. The Chinese recognized that if war came it would be an all-out war causing great destruction and that the United States might not allow any sanctuary to China. It was acknowledged that the United States could inflict heavy casualties and that China would have to mobilize vast reserves of manpower. The Chinese believed that the United States would be able to destroy "at one stroke, our military strength, economic centers and communications hubs by launching sudden raids, and thus try to deprive us of our ability to resist." The escalation of war to China was regarded as highly prob-

able.⁷ The Chinese also believed that the war would be fought in three dimensions, "rear, front, and everywhere." All this made it imperative that everyone must be a soldier.⁸

To achieve this goal, intensive militia training and constant preparedness were increased. Preparedness was apparently stressed not only at the militia level but also in the sphere of nuclear weapons development. The fear of conflict gave a great impetus to the attainment at a forced pace of nuclear research and weapons capability. A growing emphasis was placed on the destructiveness of modern conventional and nuclear weapons and also on

the necessity to produce them. There was growing fear that the Japan-Korea Treaty would be used to bring Japan in on the American side in the event of any United States-North Korean or Sino-American war. According to the Chinese interpretation of the "Three-Arrow Plan" and the "Flying Dragon Plan," Japan was to support the United States and to put her forces under American command within 30 days of such hostilities.⁹

LIN PIAO AND "PEOPLE'S WAR"

During the height of this debate, on September 3, 1965, the famous Lin Piao article on People's War came out in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*). Contrary to the assumption that this was Peking's clarion call for world revolution, the article was a major foreign policy statement by the Mao-Lin faction on Vietnam and thus on Sino-American relations. Among other premises, it emphasized that massive American intervention had changed the status of the Vietnam conflict from a guerrilla war to a war of national resistance. Because of this change, the National Liberation Front was following an incorrect line. To fight a war of national resistance, the Front was told to follow a united front policy. Lastly, Lin's article gave notice to the National Liberation Front that Chinese assistance would vary, depending on international circumstances. Primarily addressed to the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front, Lin gave notice that the Chinese preferred to follow what has been called "the lower risk policy of indirect conflict."¹⁰

It is interesting to note that the issue of the *Peking Review* which published Lin Piao's article also published an article by Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing which again took the opposite view on the nature of the United States threat and the nature of the conflict in Vietnam. As before, Lo took the position that the war could escalate to China and that conditional support for Vietnam was not enough.¹¹ Clearly, in September, 1965, the debate over Vietnam was by no means settled but was rather at its high point. Lo was supported by P'eng Chen, who announced

⁷ Chang Ching, "How to View Enemy's Opposition," *Hung-ch'i* (*Red Flag*), No. 2, February 27, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 462, March 29, 1965; "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and Courageously Drive Ahead," *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 1, 1965, pp. 8-11; "Complete All Preparations for Smashing Aggression by U.S. Imperialism," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (*China Youth*), No. 23, December 1, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 508, January 24, 1966, pp. 39-42; Fang Mu-hui, "A Militia Force of Returned Overseas Chinese on the Front of Coastal Defense," *Ch'iao-wu Pao* (*Overseas Chinese Affairs Journal*), No. 6, December, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 510, February 7, 1966, pp. 1-3. According to some reports, it was during this period that China started to fortify the Island of Hainan.

⁸ Lin Yun-cheng, "The Role of People's Militia," *Peking Review*, No. 6, February 5, 1965.

⁹ Lin Yun-cheng, *op. cit.*; Liu Hua-ch'iu and Shih Chen, "Look How U.S. Imperialism Is Stepping Up Preparations for Attack on China!" *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (*China Youth*), No. 23, December 1, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 507, January 17, 1966, pp. 1-3. Curiously enough, this article also mentioned among other bases two U.S. bases in India, though it did not give any troop figures for these bases.

¹⁰ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War!" *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 3, 1965, pp. 9-30. (For excerpts from this article see *Current History*, September, 1966, pp. 172ff.) For a reasoned analysis of this article see D. P. Mozingo and T. W. Robinson, "Lin Piao on 'People's War': China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam," *Rand Memorandum*, RM-4814-PR, November, 1965, especially p. 18. It must be kept in mind, however, that Lin Piao's article by no means ended the debate in China, nor was its the last authoritative announcement in this connection. At most, it should be considered as an authoritative statement of the Mao-Lin position. The debate over whether to intervene or not to intervene continued for another year.

¹¹ Lo Jui-ch'ing, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism Too," *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 3, 1965, pp. 31-39. The publication of these two viewpoints side by side in *Peking Review* may indicate that both factions had about equal strength during 1965.

that China "must take U.S. imperialist aggression and provocation seriously."¹²

At the national day celebrations on October 1, 1965, a *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), editorial glorified the Maoist strategy and did not emphasize the danger of escalation to China.¹³ A similar position was taken by Chou En-lai, who merely expressed support both for North Vietnam's Four-Point Plan and for the National Liberation Front's Five-Point Plan for peace negotiations.¹⁴

At this time and in the next few months, Foreign Minister and Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi was more militant than either Chou or the general foreign ministry statements. At a press conference in Peking on September 29, 1965, he took a strong position on China's role

in Vietnam. He apparently came under attack for this and was taken to task for "seeking adventures."¹⁵ But this did not seem to affect his views; in his December 30, 1965, interview with a correspondent of the Japanese newspaper *Akahata*, he strongly defended the opinions he had expressed at the press conference of September 29 and emphasized that United States escalation in Vietnam was directed against China.¹⁶

THE DEBATE CONTINUES

The debate over Vietnam and the Sino-American confrontation was still very much undecided as of early 1966. Early that year, the Lo-P'eng faction gained another powerful public supporter. Liu Shao-ch'i, who had kept very much out of public debate in 1965, joined the Lo-P'eng group, stating that China would support Vietnam despite the nature and extent of the United States involvement and escalation.¹⁷ In February, 1966, he even administered a public rebuke to Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah for indulging in peacemaking. According to him, Afro-Asian nations must not take a middle position between the "aggressor and the victim of aggression."¹⁸

Subsequently, on his tour of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Burma in March-April, 1966, Liu took a slightly more moderate position. This might have been due either to the fact that the host countries were not willing to take anything but a "middle position" or to an attempt to tone down Asian fears of a general Sino-American war.¹⁹ Similar restraint was not shown by Ch'en Yi, however, who was also in Pakistan in April, 1966. He asserted that the United States was "genuinely making active preparations for attacking China."²⁰

It was during this trip of Liu Shao-ch'i that the strongest *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), editorial on the danger of war with the United States appeared. It emphasized the fact that the United States was "constantly threatening China with war" and instead that it was the United States and not China which wanted war. It concluded, therefore, that China must be prepared for a

¹² P'eng Chen, "Speech at the National Day Celebrations," October 1, 1965, Peking, New China News Agency (NCNA) (in English), October 1, 1965; P'eng Chen, "Speech at a Reception for Tran Van Thanh, Head of the Permanent Mission of the National Liberation Front," December 20, 1965, to celebrate the 5th anniversary of the National Liberation Front, *Peking Review*, No. 52, December 24, 1965, p. 9.

¹³ Editorial, "National Day Editorial," *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), October 1, 1965, Peking, NCNA (in English), October 1, 1965.

¹⁴ Chou En-lai, "Speech at National Day Celebrations," Peking, NCNA (in English), September 30, 1965.

¹⁵ Ch'en Yi, "China Dares to Run the Risks to Thoroughly Defeat U.S. Imperialism," Speech by Ch'en Yi at Kunming, Yunnan, at a Banquet in Honor of Sihanouk by the Governor of Yunnan, October 13, 1965, *Peking Review*, No. 43, October 22, 1965, especially p. 16.

¹⁶ "Ch'en Yi Replies to *Akahata* Correspondent," *Peking Review*, No. 2, January 7, 1966.

¹⁷ "Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i Replies to President Ho Chi Minh," Peking, January 30, 1966, in *Peking Review*, No. 6, February 4, 1966, pp. 5-6.

¹⁸ "Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i on Vietnam Question," Speech in Honor of Nkrumah, February 24, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 10, March 4, 1966, p. 5; it was during this trip that Nkrumah fell from power in Ghana.

¹⁹ "Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i's Speech at Pakistan State Banquet Given by President Ayub Khan," *Peking Review*, No. 14, April 1, 1966, pp. 5-6; "Speech in Afghanistan," *Peking Review*, No. 15, April 8, 1966; "Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i's Speech at Burmese State Banquet Given by Chairman Ne Win," *Peking Review*, No. 17, April 22, 1966. The *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*) editorial of March 27, 1966, devoted to Liu Shao-ch'i's speech in Pakistan took the same line as his speech. It emphasized that the present international situation was very complicated and that there was an inherent danger of conflict.

²⁰ "Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi's Speech at Dacca Civic Reception," April 15, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 17, April 22, 1966, pp. 7-8.

war which the United States might start at some later date and even more prepared for an early war; "we must be prepared for a small-scale war and even more for a large-scale war." An early war was characterized as one that would have to be fought in 1966 or 1967, while a large-scale war was one in which the "U.S. imperialists will use all their strength, sending several million or even ten million troops to China."²¹

Throughout the first half of 1966, Chou

²¹ Editorial, "The War Threat of U.S. Imperialism Must Be Taken Seriously," *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), April 6, 1966.

²² "Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Toward the U.S.," April 10, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 20, May 13, 1966, p. 5; "China Ready at Any Time to Take All Necessary Actions to Aid Vietnamese People's Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism to the End," *Peking Review*, No. 30, July 22, 1966; see further Chou's speeches in honor of the Albanian delegation which visited China for the 1966 May Day celebrations. Even in these speeches Chou maintained conditional support for Vietnam. See "Comrade Chou En-lai's Speech at Peking Mass Rally," to greet the Albanian delegation for May Day celebrations, headed by Mehmet Shehu, *Peking Review*, No. 19, May 6, 1966, pp. 21-25; "Comrade Mehmet Shehu's Speech at Farewell Banquet," May 10, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 21, May 20, 1966. Even in his visit to Albania in June, 1966, Chou maintained the same attitude. See "Comrade Chou En-lai's Speech at Tirana Mass Rally," *Peking Review*, No. 27, July 1, 1966.

²³ "China's Aid to Vietnam in Fighting U.S. Aggression Further Ceases to Be Subject to Any Bounds or Restrictions," *Peking Review*, No. 28, July 8, 1966 (Chinese Government Statement on the Bombing of Hanoi); "Vice-Premier Chen Yi's Speech at the Peking Mass Rally," *Peking Review*, No. 29, July 15, 1966; and "U.S. Aggression Has No Bounds, and Our Counter to Aggression Has No Bounds Either," *Peking Review*, No. 28, July 8, 1966, pp. 20-23 and 42.

²⁴ "Statement of Chairman Liu Shao-ch'i of the People's Republic of China," Speech at Peking Mass Meeting in Support of Vietnam at Tien An Men Gate, July 22, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 31, July 29, 1966.

²⁵ "Bring Forth a Workers' Force Which Combines Labor with Military Duties Like the Old Red Army," *Shui-li Yu Tien-li* (Water Conservation and Electric Power), No. 4, February 20, 1966, in *SCMM*, No. 570, April 3, 1967, pp. 8-13. Articles like this were the exception to the otherwise general toning down of the glorification of China's strategy during the civil war and the war of national resistance.

²⁶ "Communiqué of the Eleventh Session of the Eighth CC of the CCP," August 12, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 34, August 19, 1966, pp. 4-8; see further the editorials in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily) of August 25, 1966, and of *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily) of August 23, 1966. Both of these editorials took the Mao-Lin position on war strategy. For excerpts from the text of this communiqué, see pp. 167 ff. of this issue.

En-lai also took an increasing part in the Vietnam debate. His most important statement on this question was in a Karachi press conference in April, 1966. In retrospect, it seems certain that Chou En-lai threw his weight behind the Mao-Lin policy of non-intervention and conditional support. Chou's constant speeches and his importance to the new Mao-Lin-Chou coalition, at least in foreign policy, have led some observers to believe that Chou may be the sole beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution.²²

With the United States bombing of Hanoi in July, 1966, the debate on Vietnam and Sino-American relations flared up in China again. Both the Chinese government and Ch'en Yi made statements which announced that this "escalation" by the United States had removed all constraints from Chinese actions.²³ In sharp contrast to Chou and in line with Ch'en Yi, both Liu Shao-ch'i and Vice-Premier T'ao Chu took an extremely militant line on the United States bombing of Hanoi. In his last public speech before his denunciation by the Red Guards, Liu Shao-ch'i categorically stated that aggression against Vietnam was aggression against China and that the 17th parallel was no longer a valid frontier.²⁴

During the first seven months of 1966, there were very few statements in support of Lin Piao's position.²⁵ The only exception to this were speeches by Chou En-lai; thus it could be assumed that Chou was the principal spokesman opposing the Liu-Lo-P'eng faction during this period. By August, 1966, a new coalition in foreign policy had apparently emerged, led by Mao, Lin and Chou. That this coalition won the policy debate at the eleventh plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) is evident from the communiqué of the eleventh plenum. The communiqué gave less attention to United States imperialism than to Soviet revisionism and emphasized only conditional support for Vietnam. Even the war threat was minimized, with a perfunctory statement that should the United States start a war against China, the Chinese were ready to meet the threat.²⁶

THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN THE U.S.

The peace movement in the United States received only marginal attention in the Chinese press. The hope was expressed that the peace movement would "shock" the American "ruling classes" and that the civil rights and peace movements would be fused.²⁷ But judging from the nature of the Chinese debate on the possibility of conflict with the United States, the Chinese did not pin much hope on the peace movement either in the United States or in the world at large. The decision of the August, 1966, plenum bears out this conclusion, as does the adoption of the policy of "conditional assistance" and the strategy of management of the Sino-American conflict through the "minimum risk policy" of indirect conflict and people's war. By August, 1966, the Chinese saw very little evidence that the United States would either invade

North Vietnam or escalate the war into China. They were also convinced that neither the peace movement nor "world public opinion" would force the United States to withdraw from Vietnam.

Since the August, 1966, plenum of the Central Committee, it has become evident that the policy debate on Sino-American relations has ended and that the Mao-Lin coalition has been able to carry the Central Committee in favor of a "low risk" confrontation with the United States. From August, 1966, to September, 1967, the Chinese press has done nothing but glorify the Maoist strategy as practiced in both the Chinese civil war and the war of "national resistance" against Japan.²⁸ There is no evidence of any public support for the Liu-Lo-P'eng policy of following the strategy of the Second World War in Vietnam.

CONCLUSIONS

After 18 months of very serious debate, the Chinese leadership has decided that at the present time China must practice the "low risk indirect confrontation strategy." The validity of the Mao-Lin-Chou line has been further demonstrated by the events in Vietnam. As yet, the United States has neither escalated the war to China nor shown any inclination to withdraw. The strategy of self-reliance and conditional assistance to Vietnam has created certain strains in the relationships between Peking and Hanoi.²⁹ Nevertheless, China has been able to keep out of war and thus escape serious losses. By contrast, the United States has had to fight an increasingly bitter war with high American losses and with minimum risk to the Chinese.

(Continued on page 175)

²⁷ Kuo Chi-chou, "The Storm of Struggle of the American People," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 13, December 6, 1965, in *SCMM*, No. 505, January 3, 1966.

²⁸ Tung Ming, "The People's Revolutionary Strategy Will Surely Triumph Over U.S. Imperialism's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy,"—In Commemoration of the First Anniversary of the Publication of Comrade Lin Piao's essay "Long Live People's War!" *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 9, 1966, pp. 12–14; "An Army and a People Equipped with Chairman Mao's Thinking on People's War Are Invincible"—People's Liberation Army men and militiamen study "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" in conjunction with war preparedness, *Peking Review*, No. 39, September 23, 1966; "The Great Power of the People's War,"—Vietnam, *Peking Review*, No. 39, September 23, 1966; Tung Ming, "The Invincible Weapon That Guarantees Victory in People's Revolutionary Wars," *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 1, 1967; Observer, "Smash the Big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy," *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily)*, February 20, 1967; "The Nation's Revolutionary Masses Repudiate China's Khrushchev," *Peking Review*, No. 16, April 14, 1967; Editorial, "Hold High the Great Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking: Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution," *Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily)*, April 18, 1967, *Peking Review*, No. 18, April 29, 1967; Li Tsai-han, "Bring into Play the Glorious Traditions of the People's Armed Forces, Perform New Deeds of Merit in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 6, April, 1967, in *SCMM*, No. 577, May 29, 1967; Editorial, "Warmly Respond to the Call to Support the Army and Cherish the People," *Hung-ch'i (Red Flag)*, No. 6, April, 1967, in *SCMM*, No. 575, May 16, 1967.

²⁹ Owing to lack of space, it is not possible here to go into a detailed discussion of Sino-Vietnamese relations.

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"In spite of the struggle for world communist leadership, the Sino-Soviet conflict is still contained within the framework of communism." As this specialist explores the conflict, he concludes that "The final outcome remains in abeyance as much as does the outcome of the power struggle within China herself."

Moscow and the Current Chinese Crisis

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THE CURRENT CRISIS in China appears to be inextricably linked to the conflict between Moscow and Peking. The problem of today can only be fully understood against the background of the years 1956 to 1958, when Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policy in Russia, coupled with his emphasis on a strategy of "peaceful coexistence," was countered by the radical change of course initiated by Mao

Tse-tung in China. Mao's Great Leap Forward and his new emphasis on the use of violence in "wars of national liberation" were not only in direct opposition to Khrushchev's line but also marked a complete break with the course previously followed by Mao in China.¹

What caused this radical change of course? Why, at this late stage, did Mao (who heretofore had adhered to a Soviet type of communist development for China) enter on a new uncharted course that was to lead him eventually into the experiment of the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution?

When Mao was threatened by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization, he first secured his own position in China,² and then demanded a new role as a partner in policy-making for the bloc and the movement, a role which would secure him against future threats from Moscow. In his words, there had to be "real," not only "formal," consultation.³ His own interpretation of the changed world situation resulting from Soviet technical advances led Mao to promote—during his 1957 visit to Moscow—a new line of aggressive communist policy under the slogan "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind."⁴

When Khrushchev ignored Mao's policy proposal and his request for partnership, the stage was set for the Sino-Soviet conflict over

¹ After consolidating their power in China, the Communists had followed the Soviet example of a staged transformation of the country toward a Communist goal, complete with a party and administrative hierarchy, a five year plan with Soviet aid, mass ideological indoctrination and participation in the Stalin cult. In international affairs as well, the Chinese Communists had faithfully adhered to the Soviet line. Even the shift to peaceful coexistence, after Stalin's death, was expressed—prior to the Soviet formulation—by the Chinese "five principles of peaceful coexistence" agreed upon with India in 1954 and restated at the Bandung Conference of 1955.

Now all this was to change. The proclamation of a new aggressive Chinese policy abroad was coupled with the introduction in China of the Great Leap Forward and the Commune System, a radical shortcut to communism that violated all prior principles of orderly Communist development derived from the Soviet experience.

² For Mao's handling of the de-Stalinization problem see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

³ See Franz Michael, "Khrushchev's Disloyal Opposition: Structural Change and Power Struggle in the Communist Bloc," *Orbis*, Spring, 1963.

⁴ See *ibid.*, for Mao's speech at Moscow University.

power and policy. If Mao wanted to assert his leading role in world communism, he needed to strengthen his home base and demonstrate that, under his aegis, China would be advanced enough to challenge the Soviet leadership. On his return from Moscow, Mao prepared his new radical policy and, as we know today,⁵ forced it upon his reluctant or hostile colleagues. Under a policy of rapid communization, all private property would be abolished, family relationships would be dissolved, work would be paid in kind and "according to need," and mass organization and will power would replace capital accumulation in advancing the economy to that stage of affluence which would prepare Chinese society for the final stage of communism.

Mao's shift to this new, utopian scheme, so different from the policy of the preceding years, has been explained in various ways. Some have seen in it a return to an earlier predilection for a direct, military approach; others have speculated on the signs of Mao's increasing mental decline. Whatever weight may be assigned to such factors, the Great Leap Forward was certainly meant to be and was understood as a challenge to Soviet leadership.

At that time the Soviet Union's leading role in world communism was based on only one claim—that of being ahead on the way to communism, ahead on the road which all others had to follow. It was Mao's claim that China's Great Leap Forward enabled her to "bypass the Soviet Union on the way to communism."⁶

The disastrous failure of Mao's policy ended the challenge of this claim; it also undermined Mao's position in China. In

December, 1958, at a Central Committee meeting, the retreat began. The major features of the communes were abandoned and with them the claim that they were shortcuts to communism. At the same time, Mao was removed from his position as chairman of the Republic, and his successor, Liu Shao-ch'i, set about to dismantle Mao's radical program and to lead China back to a more rational economic development in the traditional communist framework. It is more than likely that the Soviet leadership, strongly opposed to the Great Leap, had a hand in aborting Mao's scheme.⁷

Whatever role he may have played in this retreat and Mao's demotion, Khrushchev was clearly involved in the major attack mounted against Mao half a year later by China's highest military commander, P'eng Teh-huai, the minister of defense. P'eng, who had been commander of the Chinese "volunteer" armies in Korea and was responsible for Chinese military modernization with the help of Soviet equipment and training, was opposed from the outset to Mao's adventurous policy and its military consequences.⁸ At the Central Committee meeting in August, 1959, he openly attacked Mao's whole leadership position, with the assumed foreknowledge and approval of Khrushchev.⁹

Mao survived the attack by threatening that he would not accept defeat if he were deserted by the party, but would form his own forces and launch civil war. Why the party majority stood by Mao in this fateful meeting is a matter of speculation. Having succeeded in neutralizing Mao's radical domestic plans, the party leaders may well have been willing to support their chief in a display of organizational unity against an attack that could have led to Russian domination of Chinese affairs.

The battle for world communist leadership continued. At the Soviet Communist Party Congress of 1961, Khrushchev created the theoretical construct of the "party of the whole people" and the "state of the whole people," according to which class struggle had been eliminated in the Soviet Union and Soviet society was within reach of commu-

⁵ See Ting Wang, "*I-chiu-liu-i nien-ti chung-kung tang-nei tou-cheng*" (the Communist Internal Party Struggle of 1961), *Ming Pao*, Hong Kong, October 23 and 24, 1966.

⁶ See Franz Michael, "Who is Ahead on the Way to Communism?" *Communist Affairs* (Los Angeles), Vol. 4, No. 6, November/December, 1966.

⁷ See Michael, "Khrushchev's Disloyal Opposition."

⁸ See Ting Wang, *op. cit.*

⁹ See David H. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 8, October/December, 1961.

nism within the present generation.¹⁰ The Chinese bitterly rejected this doctrinal claim. Having failed in his attempt to "bypass the Soviet Union on the way to Communism," Mao now accused the Soviets, first indirectly and then directly, of having disqualified themselves from the race; they had deviated from the course, had backtracked and were "revisionists," sliding back down the path to capitalism. The Chinese and their leader, Mao Tse-tung, were the only true Marxist-Leninists and the proper leaders of world communism. It was this claim that justified Mao's attempt to establish his own following within the Communist Party of each country in order to take over world leadership from the Moscow "revisionists."

BATTLE AGAINST REVISIONISM

In the bitter ideological battle that continued over the following years, Communist China seemed to speak with one voice. In the unsuccessful negotiations of 1962 and in the nine detailed letters of accusation of 1963-1964,¹¹ the Chinese initiated a crescendo of attack, directed more and more personally against Khrushchev, who was maligned in a five-volume publication of his history and utterances. After Khrushchev's fall and a short pause in the propaganda battle against Moscow, Mao resumed the attack against "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev," when it became apparent that the Soviets were unwilling to meet him more than half way.

All the while, Mao rebuilt his power in China, planning to stage a comeback from his defeat and the defeat of his plan for the Great Leap Forward. His main tools were his personal image—built up through the propagation of the invincibility of the

Thought of Mao Tse-tung, which was to encompass all wisdom and solve all problems—and the army, which Mao used as the instrument for his reconquest of power from the "revisionists."¹²

After the purge of P'eng Teh-huai and some 40 key army officers in 1959, the new army commanders, Lin Piao and his chief of staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing, appeared willing to transform the army into an obedient instrument of Mao's plans. Together with the rest of China, the army had to accept the recall of all Soviet advisers and to abandon its hope of Soviet equipment and support in its modernization program. The reestablishment of an effective system of political bureaus, party committees, political commissars and party cells was to transform the army into a political force systematically indoctrinated with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung.¹³

While Mao rebuilt his image and created a loyal instrument for the anticipated power struggle within China, the regular party bureaucracy under the leadership of Liu Shao-ch'i restored a viable economy. By 1965, China was believed to have regained the level of grain production and general economic output of 1957, the year before the catastrophic Great Leap Forward. Since population had grown in the meantime, the economic situation was still serious enough, but China was moving toward economic recovery and development within the regular communist framework.

AN UNEASY BALANCE

This uneasy internal balance, with its latent power struggle, was critically upset when the world situation reactivated the issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the spring of 1965, when the "national liberation war" brought the communists close to victory in South Vietnam, the United States decided on a massive military intervention. This intervention soon began to turn the tide, and by the end of the year the situation looked very serious for the communist aggressors. At the same time—and related to Vietnam—there occurred great setbacks for the whole communist revolutionary strategy in the Afro-

¹⁰ See Michael, "Who is Ahead on the Way to Communism?"

¹¹ See *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press (Peking), 1965.

¹² See Franz Michael, "The Struggle for Power," *Problems of Communism*, May/June, 1967.

¹³ See John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), Chaps. 5 & 12, and Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1967), Chap. 11.

Asian world which had been so much emphasized in Communist Chinese propaganda.

Setbacks in Africa and the failure of the coup in Indonesia, with Sukarno's loss of power, upset the entire communist strategy of revolutionary wars, and led to a Soviet reappraisal of policy and of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The vastly increased Soviet support for North Vietnam was soon combined with a Soviet appeal for communist unity in the face of the seriousness of the Vietnamese situation. This Soviet appeal for unity, as well as the actual fear in China of war with the United States, accelerated the power struggle in an already divided China. The period between September, 1965, and May, 1966, appears to have been the crucial time for this power struggle, both within the army and between Mao and the leadership of the party.

The impact of the Soviet appeal can be measured by the opposed views of the two leading military men, by the general violent press reaction, and by the purges that followed. Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of staff, once on Mao's team in army policy, appeared to have had second thoughts about the policy of going it alone. In his article of May 11, 1965, published by *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*,¹⁴ Lo clearly called for unity in the battle against American "imperialism" in Vietnam and elsewhere. In his speech at the September 3, 1965, celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the victory over Japan, Lo repeated his appeal.¹⁵ He went even further. His inter-

pretation of the conflict with the Soviet Union, totally at variance with that officially expressed by his Chinese as well as his Soviet colleagues, ascribed to it a positive value for the communist purpose of world conquest, rarely understood even in the West. As he saw it:

One aspect of the historic significance of the debate of the last few years between the two lines in the international communist movement is that it has enabled Marxism-Leninism to spread on an unprecedented scale and has promoted the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the people's revolution in every country.

At least to a point, the "debate" was something which had been constructive and which did not appear as a bitter, irreconcilable rift. As this juncture, however, the second in command of the People's Liberation Army advocated by implication a change of course toward unity that would have to lead China back into the communist fraternity, to cooperation with the Soviet Union, and to all the political consequences following from such a change.

In the light of this stand by Lo, Lin Piao's statement issued on September 3, 1965, acquires an added significance.¹⁶ Lin Piao's propagation of "national wars of liberation" as the chief communist strategy of attack was widely publicized in the West. Lin's comparison of guerrilla warfare—in which the communist conquest of the countryside led to the fall of the cities—with "wars of national liberation"—where the conquest of agricultural countries was to lead to the fall of industrial countries—was widely quoted. But Lin Piao's emphasis on "wars of national liberation" contained one vital point, often overlooked: the wars against Western "imperialism" were to be fought by the people of each country on their own. This could mean not only that China was unwilling or unable to come to the direct support of North Vietnam, but also that China, as well as Vietnam, could fight a "people's war" on her own without having to ask for Soviet support.

Lin Piao's refutation of the Soviet appeal for unity was echoed in the entire Maoist press; the Soviets were accused of taking

¹⁴ After duly criticizing Khrushchev's "revisionism,"—but admitting the usefulness of negotiations—Lo stressed the importance of "uniting the socialist camp" in the mounting battle with U.S. "imperialism." The Chinese Communists "had full confidence in the great Soviet people and the great Soviet army" and were "deeply confident that we will be united on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism"; see "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle against U.S. Imperialism through to the end," *Peking Review*, No. 20, May 14, 1965, pp. 7-15.

¹⁵ In this speech Lo referred favorably to Lin Piao's statement of the same date. He repeated his attacks against Khrushchev's "revisionism." But he warned against the U.S. threat of an "Asian War" and spoke of a "united front" and the "powerful socialist camp." See *Peking Review*, No. 36, September 3, 1965, pp. 31-39.

¹⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 9-30.

"united action" with the United States rather than with the communist world. They had given military aid to India and their support to North Vietnam, according to the Chinese, only served the purpose of forcing North Vietnamese withdrawal from the south and unconditional surrender to the United States. The united action slogan was characterized as another Soviet attempt to reestablish hegemony over China and Albania and to recover the status of "father party" of the bloc and movement.¹⁷

ECHOES ABROAD

This official Chinese opposition to the Soviet call for unity was repeated by foreign communist leaders in the Maoist camp, who declared that there "cannot be and there should not be unity between Marxist-Leninists and modern revisionists. Calling for unprincipled peace in the name of unity means degeneration and decay."¹⁸ The Soviet revisionists were not only betraying the Soviet

people and restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union, but were trying to impose their betrayal on the international communist movement.¹⁹

Summing up their case against the Soviet appeal, the Chinese repeated all the arguments of the ideological warfare of the early 1960's.²⁰ In answer to a slate of Soviet articles calling for unity and solidarity²¹ the Chinese listed what they claimed to be the basic differences between their own true faith and Soviet revisionism. They held the revolutionary line while the Soviets stressed peaceful coexistence; they regarded the United States as the common enemy of the people while the Soviets collaborated with the United States for world domination; they stressed proletarian dictatorship while the Soviets believed in the state and party of the whole people; they were for Marxist-Leninist independence, equality and mutual consultation while the Soviets were for big power chauvinism; they regarded revisionism as the main danger while the Soviets embraced the Tito clique. This warming up of all the slogans of the ideological battle was the official Chinese answer to the Soviet Communist appeal for unity.

SOVIET AID FOR HANOI

A major issue within this argument over Sino-Soviet cooperation on Vietnam was the question of the passage of Soviet war material through China to North Vietnam. Repeated Soviet protestations against Chinese obstruction of the transit of Soviet military equipment bound for Vietnam met with heated refutations from the Chinese press.²² When the Soviet allegations of Chinese high dollar charges for transit costs were reprinted in the American press, the Chinese were bitterly resentful.²³ The contradictory Chinese attitude was revealed when the foreign minister, Chen Yi, in an interview with a Japanese press correspondent,²⁴ declared that it was a deliberate slander to say that China had held up transit of war material to North Vietnam or had charged for it, and in the same breath raised the rhetorical question as to why Soviet military material could not be

¹⁷ See editorials in *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 46, Nov. 12, 1965, pp. 10-21. The contrast between alleged Soviet softness and Chinese heroism was brought out in an article by Yan Pin, "Two diametrically opposite views of life and death," in *Yang-ch'eng Wan-pao*, Canton, November 16, 1965. In this article Wang Chieh, a legendary Chinese Communist soldier who gave up his life to save others is held up as a heroic example in contrast to Soviet "bourgeoisie humanitarianism."

¹⁸ See statement by the Australian and New Zealand Communist leaders E. F. Hill, and V. G. Wilcox, *Peking Review*, No. 51, December 17, 1965, pp. 21, 22.

¹⁹ From an article in the Peruvian Communist paper *Bandera Roja*, as quoted in *ibid*.

²⁰ See *Peking Review*, No. 1, January 1, 1966, pp. 9-11.

²¹ The Soviet articles referred to are: "Correct Path of Unity," *Izvestia*, December 7, 1965; "The Militant Banner of the International Communist Movement," *Selskaya Zhizn*, December 7, 1965; "Guarantee of New Victories for the World Movement is Solidarity," *Kraznaya Zvezda*, December 14, 1965; "The Banner of Unity," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 14, 1965; "Let Revolutionary Forces Unite," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, December 14, 1965; "Line Confirmed by Life Itself," *Pravda*, December 12, 1965.

²² See *Red Flag* editorial, Nov., 1965, translated in FBIS No. 218, supplement to the *Far East*, U.S. Hong Kong Consulate Circular No. 776, No. 17, 1965.

²³ See article "How Low Can They Sink!" *People's Daily*, December 23, 1965.

²⁴ See *Peking Review*, No. 2, January 7, 1966, pp. 5-7.

shipped by sea to North Vietnam like that of other countries. The Soviets, so the foreign minister said, were using their aid to control Vietnam and to force the Vietnamese question into the orbit of Soviet-United States collaboration.²⁵

The issue of interference with Soviet aid remained active throughout 1966. In November, 1966, a Soviet scientist stated that American aggression in Vietnam would have been cut short long ago if China had agreed to join the communist bloc in a common policy. This accusation was repeated on different occasions by a member of the Soviet Politburo, and most forcefully by the defense minister, Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky, in a speech in Red Square on November 7.²⁶ It was not until March, 1967, that the issue fell dormant, at the time of the rumored agreement between Moscow and Peking that settled the transit issue.

AN AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP

Throughout 1965 and early 1966, the Soviet relationship with China and the Chinese attitude toward the Soviets remained ambiguous. Internationally, the battle continued. Unable to exclude the Soviets from participation in the proposed Afro-Asian meeting in Algeria in 1965, the Chinese postponed the meeting indefinitely.²⁷ But official ceremonial relationships and contacts were still maintained. In October, 1965, a Soviet army band of 180 members arrived in China for a tour of the country.²⁸ In November, Peking marked the anniversary of the October Revolution with a greeting to the

U.S.S.R. and a reception at the Chinese embassy in Moscow. In December, a Soviet song and dance group visited China and was feasted by the Chinese Liberation Army. Liu Shao-ch'i congratulated Nikolai Podgorny on his election as president of the Supreme Soviet.

Even in February of 1966, the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union was still remembered; Lin Piao sent greetings to Malinovsky on the Soviet Red Army Day.²⁹ Yet throughout, Lin Piao continued to stress the concept of an army that was to rely on its own resources, and in which politics were more important than professionalism, and men more important than equipment.³⁰ Finally, in March, 1966, when the Chinese Communist leadership rejected the invitation to the twenty-third Soviet Party Congress and repeated its accusations of revisionism and refutation of the "united action" slogan, these ceremonial relations appeared to cease to exist.³¹

The Soviet effort to renew its political and military connections with the Chinese leadership on the basis of the changed world situation of 1965 was lost when Mao started his purge and succeeded in destroying his military and party opposition, which would have been the contact group for a new Sino-Soviet partnership.

INTRIGUE AND PURGE

We may never know the full story of the personal intrigue and battle that took place in China at that time. There are reports and rumors that cannot be verified; and even the large wall posters of Mao's Red Guards which contained a great deal of inside information are suspect and are believed to have often been exaggerated. Yet the general time schedule of the major events of the purge can be partly reconstructed. December, 1965, appears to have been a crucial month.

This was the month during which Lo Jui-ch'ing disappeared from public view and when Mao went to Hangchow, where he prepared his attack against the party intellectuals, an attack which was to be the opening

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ NCNA (New China News Agency), November 9, 1966.

²⁷ See *Peking Review*, No. 44, October 29, 1965, and No. 45, November 5, 1965.

²⁸ NCNA, November 20, 1965.

²⁹ NCNA, December 2, 1965; December 10, 1965; February 22, 1966.

³⁰ Lin Piao's slogans of the "four first" for the army, originally stated in 1960, placed the human factor, political work, ideological work and living ideas first over weapons, training, professionalism, and abstract theory.

³¹ This termination of formal relations coincided with the first most decisive victory of the Maoist group over the party opposition, the purge of P'eng Chen, the mayor of Peking.

move in his drive against hostile leaders.³²

Until December, 1965, Lo Jui-ch'ing still appeared at official functions. At the end of December, however, his name was the only one missing in a list of 53 military figures, when a funeral committee was formed under Lin Piao's chairmanship for the funeral of one of China's leading generals.³³ After that, Lo disappeared from public view and was not heard of again until the news and pictures showed him being dragged out and abused by Red Guards.

Lo's fall from power was a necessary prerequisite for Mao's attack against the party leadership. Between February and May, 1966, Mao seems to have felt militarily and politically strong enough to move. On February 12, Peking Mayor P'eng Chen, recently appointed by Mao as chairman of a "group of five in charge of the Cultural Revolution,"³⁴

circulated an "outline report" in which the Cultural Revolution was interpreted as being basically a theoretical argument rather than a violent purge. One of the signers of this report was listed as K'ang Sheng, a key security officer soon officially to become one of Mao's small coterie. In a circular letter of May 16, Mao strongly attacked P'eng Chen's February report, accusing P'eng of usurpation of authority, falsification of K'ang Sheng's approval, and distortion of the Cultural Revolution into a mere academic argument.³⁵ P'eng Chen was purged, and the battle was joined. The shift in control of the army and military police that followed the purge of Lo had made possible the attack against the base of the party leadership in Peking, thus effectively ending any Soviet hope of renewed contact and united action with Communist China.

The fall of Lo Jui-ch'ing and P'eng Chen led to the final showdown in China between Mao and the top party leadership. The last stage of the battle for the overthrow of the regular party leaders was initiated with the Central Committee meeting August 1-12, 1966, which passed a 16-point resolution on the Great Cultural Revolution. During the nine mass rallies of the newly established Red

(Continued on page 179)

During the summer of 1967, **Franz Michael** was engaged in a cooperative research project at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. At George Washington University he is chairman of the research colloquium on modern China, as well as a professor of Chinese history and Chinese government. Mr. Michael lived in China before and during part of World War II. His most recent trip to East Asia was from August, 1966, to February, 1967, during which time he went to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Tibetan border. He is the author of many books, including *Teiping Rebellion* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966) and *The Far East in the Modern World* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), with George E. Taylor.

³² According to one story, the crisis began with a violent clash between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. The argument became so heated that Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the party general secretary, walked out, while Mao had an attack of apoplexy, resulting in a light stroke. As a result of this confrontation and of Mao's temporary incapacitation, the party leaders were supposed to have planned to isolate Mao under close supervision, exercised by Lo Jui-ch'ing, to prevent his interference in their policy-making. See "Information From Mainland China" in *China Rebuilding*, Nos. 25 and 26, New York, January 15 and February 15, 1967 (in Chinese).

Another story has it that Lo had regarded Lin Piao as a sick man and had advised him to take care of his health. When Lin became vice-chairman, Lo was supposed to have also told friends that Lin Piao had political ambitions and would be occupied with politics and so he (Lo) would be in charge of the armed forces. Obviously, Lo was wrong. See *China News Analysis*, No. 664, June 16, 1967, p. 1, referring to a Red Guard newspaper.

Philip Bridgman in his article "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," *China Quarterly*, No. 29, January-March, 1967, p. 16, quotes revelations from Red Guard wall posters, which also stress the importance of a Central Committee meeting in September, 1965, in which "Teng Hsiao-p'ing coldly disassociated himself from Mao Tse-tung" and "made a speech in which he declared he was against any cultural change and against any changes in the schools."

This and other evidence strongly suggest that it was at this time that an open clash occurred between the party leadership and Mao Tse-tung.

³³ *People's Daily*, December 25, 1965, p. 1.

³⁴ See "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party," *Peking Review*, May 19, 1967, No. 21, pp. 6-12; and Editorials, *People's Daily*; *Hungchi*, May 18, 1967.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

Evaluating China's economic problems today, this author notes that "The long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese economy will to a great extent depend on the result of the current power struggle."

The Cultural Revolution and China's Economy

By CHU-YUAN CHENG

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THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION which erupted violently during the first year of the Third Five Year Plan and developed into a fierce power struggle between two groups of top leaders in the party's hierarchy is the outcome of many intricate factors. Among its many causes, the struggle of divergent views concerning the future path of China's economy should be regarded as a major issue. The impact of the Cultural Revolution on the national economy seemed to be slight in the early stage, when production units were protected from Red Guard interference. Its disruptive effects became conspicuous as the struggle extended into factories and communes in late 1966. Although the degree of disruption is difficult to assess at this moment, its long-run effect is bound to be profound.*

As far back as the summer of 1959, there was a bitter debate within the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) hierarchy regarding the validity of the party's general line, the commune system, and the Great Leap Forward. A group of powerful military and party leaders led by Marshal P'eng Te-huai,

the former minister of national defense and one of the founders of the Red Army, openly opposed the communes and the Great Leap. In August, 1959, after the eighth plenary session of the C.C.P. Central Committee, P'eng and his follower, General Huang K'e-ch'ien, former chief of the general staff of the army, were both dismissed.¹ P'eng's viewpoints, however, found wide support in the army, among the top leaders of the party and in the circle of leading economists as well. As Premier Chou En-lai explicitly admitted in his December, 1964, report to the National People's Congress:

From 1959 to 1962, the class enemies at home launched renewed attacks on socialism. In the countryside, quite a number of people advocated the so-called 'three-selves' and 'one-assignment' in favor of more private plots with larger free markets and the reintroduction of small enterprises with private responsibility for profit and loss.²


Chou's admission bespeaks the existence of a widespread disapproval of Mao Tse-tung's radical economic program and a general preference for a more moderate and liberal policy which is to some extent similar to the current policy prevailing in the Soviet Union.

In 1961, as the country was absorbed in the failures of the Great Leap and of the commune, the C.C.P. Central Committee introduced some significant policy adjustments,

* The author is indebted to Professor Alexander Eckstein for his valuable comments and suggestions on a draft of this paper.

¹ Chu-yuan Cheng, "Power Struggle in Communist China," *Asian Survey*, September, 1966, pp. 469-484.

² *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), December 31, 1964, hereafter referred to as *JMJP*.



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including the suspension of the Great Leap and the dramatic revision of the commune system.³ The wholesale retrenchment signified a concession by Mao and marked a major setback in his prestige. During this period, the C.C.P. Central Committee was basically under the influence of Liu Shao-ch'i, chair-

³ Chu-yuan Cheng, *Communist China's Economy, 1949-62* (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1963), pp. 149-153.

⁴ *Ching-kang-shan* (*The Ching-kang Mountain*), published by Red Guards of Tsinghua University at Peking, February 1, 1967, p. 7.

man of the Chinese People's Republic and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the secretary-general of the C.C.P. According to recent Red Guard disclosures, Liu and Teng had jointly approved measures such as allowing commune directors to assign production work down to each individual peasant household and even returning farmlands to peasants in some localities.⁴ These steps signified the revival of individual economy and the de facto dissolution of the commune system which Mao once hailed as the ladder to the communist paradise.

Toward the end of 1965, on the eve of the new five year plan, debates on the line of economic development became intensified. Those who were in power within the party apparently favored continued relaxation and decentralization in economic management as a stimulus to peasant incentive. At the same time, these leadership groups were opposed to a new great leap lest it produce acute dislocation again. Their views constituted an antithesis to Mao's doctrine that the country should follow a Spartan type of economy wherein political indoctrination would replace material incentive as the driving force. The pursuit of a Maoist policy would also have meant the imposition of tighter controls on the rural sector and the squeezing of savings from the agricultural sector in order to finance the Third Five Year Plan. To put China back on the track envisaged by Mao, and to suppress the spread of "revisionism," Mao sought the support of the army. A titanic power struggle ensued in November, 1965, and has since escalated in intensity and scope.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN 1966

Despite the political ferment and turmoil which resulted in the purge of hundreds of party, military and administration leaders, and the thorough reshuffling of the C.C.P.'s top power structure, the country seems to have functioned normally up to November, 1966. There was no sign of serious breakdowns in the economic mechanism and most of the production activities followed the original routine. Official reports available in late 1966 and early 1967 painted a rosy picture of economic performance during 1966. Although the extreme scarcity of hard information prevents us from making any precise evaluation we still can undertake a critical survey from the sporadic data revealed on the Chinese mainland.

According to official reports, capital investments in 1966 increased by 18 per cent

over 1965 and were the largest since 1961. New construction projects were built in the chemical fertilizer, power generating, petroleum and coal industries. Altogether, 84 new chemical fertilizer plants of various sizes were put into operation with an aggregate new capacity of 1.1 million tons. There were also 10 new coal pits put into operation with an annual capacity of 6 million tons or 2.5 per cent of the 1965 output. Nine cotton textile plants with a producing capacity of 600 million meters of cotton cloth per year were also put into production.⁵ These fragmentary data signal the continuous expansion of production capacity, although the scale of construction projects does not support the official claim that capital investment had increased by 18 per cent.

According to year-end official reports, the gross output value of industry increased by 20 per cent. The gain was proclaimed as the sharpest rise in three years.⁶ This official claim, however, cannot be accepted at face value. An annual increase rate in industrial output value was reported as 15 per cent for 1964 and 11 per cent for 1965. Thus the 1966 increase of 20 per cent was far sharper than that of the two preceding years. Yet there is no evidence of the requisite new investment to support such a substantial advance. During 1964-1965, the increase of industrial output was partly the increase of new investment and partly the existence of idle capacity. After two years of continuous recovery, the idle capacity still exists, although its amount has sharply diminished. As a result, the rate of increase in industrial output in 1966 might be around 15 per cent instead of 20 per cent as officials claimed.

Official output reports in several major industries are also impressive. In the field of steel production, there was a 20 per cent increase in the first nine months of 1966 as compared with the corresponding period in 1965.⁷ If this rate of increase continued into the last quarter of the year, steel output in 1966 may have reached 14 million tons, slightly surpassing the 13.4 million tons turned out in 1959. The rise of steel production was attributed mainly to the improve-

⁵ *JMJP*, June 15, 1966, p. 2; also *Ching-chi Tao-pao* (*Economic Bulletin*), Hong Kong, September 12, 1966.

⁶ *JMJP*, December 31, 1966, p. 2.

⁷ *JMJP*, September 29, 1966, p. 1.

ment of technology and the rise of productivity.⁸

In the field of energy resources, output of coal was estimated by Western experts at about 250 million tons in 1965. With only slight increases in new capacity, output of coal in 1966 was estimated at some 275 million tons, up 10 per cent from 1965 but still below the 348 million tons produced in 1959.

PETROLEUM AND FERTILIZER

The limelight of the industrial performance was cast on two fast-developing sectors: petroleum and chemical fertilizer. Output of crude oil registered a substantial gain after 1963 owing to the operation of a new major oilfield—the Ta-Ching oil field—in Manchuria. By 1964, Communist China claimed self-sufficiency in crude oil and petroleum products, which implied that petroleum output in that year reached 6 million tons. In 1965, crude oil output was estimated at 10 million tons. The 1966 output target of crude oil was reported fulfilled ahead of schedule and the newly-added capacity for crude oil and refinery in 1966 was more than the total increment of capacity during the entire Second Five Year Plan period.⁹ Based on this information, 1966 crude oil output may reach 12 million tons or double that of 1964.

Output of chemical fertilizer also showed a constant advance after 1963. The 1965 production may be estimated at 5 million tons. Since new plants with capacity of 1.1 million tons have been added in 1966, chemical fertilizer turned out in 1966 should surpass the

6-million-ton mark, representing one of the rapidly-growing industrial sectors in the post-1961 period.

Advances were also reported for the textile industry. In 1965, it was claimed that 1.4 million new spindles were put into operation.¹⁰ Facilities were continuously expanding at a moderate rate in 1966. According to official data, cotton yarn output increased by 18 per cent during the first 8 months in 1966 and is said to have set a new post-1949 record.¹¹ It is possible that cotton yarn output may reach 9 million bales in 1966, or 750,000 bales more than in 1959.¹²

Progress in the nuclear weapons program was particularly substantial. During 1966, the regime undertook three nuclear tests, on May 9, October 27 and December 29. The May 9 explosion contained some thermonuclear materials, while the October 27 test was a trial of a guided missile. The December 29 test and the new test on June 17, 1967, were tests of hydrogen bombs.¹³ These four tests during a 13-month period would suggest that defense production was not affected by the political turmoil.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

In contrast to the continuous upswing of industrial output, agricultural production in the past two years remained more or less in a state of stagnation. In late 1964, Chou En-lai forecast an increase of 5 per cent in farm production as against the 11 per cent increase in industrial production in 1965. The 1965 grain output was estimated by Western experts at 200 million tons, 8 per cent higher than that of 1957, but representing a 5 per cent decline in per capita availability of farm products.¹⁴ Despite official claims that the grain harvest in 1966 was the best in 17 years,¹⁵ independent estimates made in Hong Kong indicated a slight decline rather than an increase for 1966 output. The estimates were based on weather conditions, food ration and food imports. Numerous reports from China's mainland indicate that there had been a dry spell in north China and a serious flood in south China.

In late 1965, at the sowing time for winter

⁸ *JMJP*, December 27, 1966, p. 1.

⁹ *JMJP*, January 6, 1967, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ching-chi Tao-pao*, August 4, 1966.

¹¹ *JMJP*, September 29, 1966.

¹² The weight of one bale of cotton yarn in China is 181.44 Kg. or 400 lbs.

¹³ Chu-yuan, interview with the *U.S. News and World Report* on China's H-Bomb, July 3, 1967, p. 38.

¹⁴ Edwin F. Jones, "The Role of Development Policies and Economic Organization in Innovation and Growth: Communist China," in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, published by the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1967, p. 678.

¹⁵ *Kung-jen Jih-pao (Workers' Daily)*, Peking, December 29, 1966, p. 1; also *New China News Agency (NCNA)*, December 27, 1966.

Major Economic Indicators in Communist China 1957, 1959, 1965 and 1966

Item	Unit	1957	1959	1965	1966
1) <i>Population</i>	1,000 persons	656,630	683,000	743,000	758,000
2) <i>Industrial output</i>					
Steel	1,000 tons	5,350	13,500	12,000	14,000
Electricity	Million Kwh	19,300	41,500	40,000	50,000
Coal	1,000 tons	130,000	348,000	250,000	275,000
Crude Oil	1,000 tons	1,460	3,700	10,000	12,000
Cement	1,000 tons	6,860	12,300	9,000	10,500
Automobile	Unit	7,500	19,000	28,500	35,000
Chemical fertilizer	1,000 tons	631	2,000	4,500	6,000
Cotton yarn	1,000 bales	4,650	8,250	8,500	9,000
3) <i>Agricultural output</i>					
Grain	Million tons	185	180*	200	195
Cotton	1,000 tons	1,650	1,800*	1,900	1,900
4) <i>Foreign Trade</i>	Million dollars	3,006	4,232	3,600	4,100

* Official claim for grain output in 1959 was 270 million tons and for cotton 2.41 million tons.

wheat, many parts of north China suffered a drought, which lasted from spring through autumn.¹⁶ Observers in Hong Kong believed that there was an overall reduction in the wheat crop of 5 to 10 per cent below the figure estimated for 1965. Moreover, in early June, south China suffered from a torrential rain which caused a serious damage to the early rice crop in south China. The overall estimates point to a slight decrease of grain output from 200 million tons in 1965 to about 190 to 195 million tons in 1966. Food import from abroad in 1966 was close to 6 million tons. In many of the nation's rural areas, rationing of food was tightened again.

Despite the standstill of agricultural production—probably due to the expansion of textile export and the increasing demand for fertilizer, machinery and cereals—foreign trade continued its upward trend during 1966. Foreign trade recovery was just about com-

pleted with an estimated total turnover of \$4.1 billion reaching 1959 peak levels and constituting an 11 per cent increase over 1965. While China's trade with communist countries registered only a slight advance, trade with Japan, Hong Kong, West Germany and Britain grew very rapidly. Available data indicate that China's exports to its seven chief noncommunist trading partners—Japan, Canada, France, West Germany, Britain, Italy and Hong Kong—amounted to \$1.1 billion compared with \$880 million in 1965. Chinese imports from these same partners rose to \$825 million in 1966 compared with the \$600 million a year earlier.¹⁷ These figures represent a 25 per cent increase in export and a 37 per cent increase in import.

China's trade with Japan rose from \$470 million in 1965 to \$621 million in 1966, up 32 per cent. As a result, Japan has displaced the Soviet Union as China's number one trading partner. Next comes Hong Kong, with a turnover of \$480 million compared with \$406 million in 1965, representing an

¹⁶ *JMJP*, September 11, 1966, p. 2.

¹⁷ *The New York Times*, February 19, 1967.

18 per cent increase. China's trade with West Germany rose substantially, from \$152 million in 1965 to more than \$200 million in 1966. The 31.6 per cent increase placed West Germany ahead of Britain as China's number one trade partner in West Europe.

In contrast, China's trade with the Soviet Union dropped from \$449 million in 1964 to \$417 million in 1965, representing a decrease of 7 per cent. It was expected to decline even further in 1966. China's trade with Cuba dropped from \$226 million in 1965 to an estimated \$170 million in 1966.¹⁸ The only communist country which significantly increased its trade with China in 1966 was North Vietnam. The share of noncommunist countries in China's total trade was 73 per cent in 1966 compared with 70 per cent in 1965 and 25 per cent in 1959, indicating a continuing shift of China's trade away from the communist countries toward the noncommunist world.

DISRUPTION OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The foregoing analysis indicates that there were no signs of serious disruption in Chinese agricultural and industrial production at least until November, 1966. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (November, 1965–August, 1966), control over the rural economy was tightened in many localities. Reports from refugees who fled to Hong Kong and Macao disclosed that in some parts of southern China, farm markets had been abolished and peasants were permitted to sell their privately-grown products only to state agents at a price fixed by the government.¹⁹ Although there has been no official statement which could be used to verify these reports, it is possible that the Maoist group attempted to resume a tighter control over the rural economy, with an intention to reinforce the commune system.

There were also some straws in the wind indicating that the leaders might also be contemplating a new leap forward program.

Since May, 1966, official reports have been stressing the fact that a new situation had emerged in the national economy which was characterized by a continuous upsurge.²⁰ The communiqué of the eleventh plenary session of the C.C.P. Central Committee, issued in early August, 1966, also reiterated: "an invigorating revolutionary atmosphere prevails in the whole country and the situation is one of a new all-round leap forward." On November 10, 1966, an editorial in the party newspaper, *People's Daily* (JMJP) emphasized that "Cultural Revolution is a powerful motive force for developing social productive forces in our economy." Although there has been no clear indication of the nature and scope of the new leap forward plan conceived in Peking, it is possible that Mao and his followers were attempting to resume a radical program which would prove the correctness of his theory that through political indoctrination, a high degree of mass mobilization, and the fullest utilization of existing facilities and equipment, China could achieve a high rate of economic growth.

Notwithstanding Mao's possible intention to restore the communes and the great leap, economic activities were still carried out along the guidelines set up at the end of 1965. Until November, 1966, the party leadership was careful lest the Cultural Revolution harm the smooth functioning of the economy. The 16-point resolution issued by the party's Central Committee in early August, 1966, provided for the protection of scientists, technicians and workers in production units. In early September, when Red Guard rampages disturbed many major cities, the party's organ *People's Daily* (in its September 7, 1966 editorial) demanded that Red Guards not interfere with industrial and mining enterprises, to avoid disrupting production. In his September 16, 1966, speech at the mass rally of Red Guards held in T'ien An Men, Chou En-lai reemphasized this point. On November 10, 1966, the *People's Daily* editorial reiterated an earlier demand that production in factories, mines and communes must not be interrupted, and that labor discipline must be maintained.

¹⁸ *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), November 10, 1966, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, October 7, 1966, pp. 3–4.

²⁰ NCNA, Shanghai, August 31, 1966.

The turning point came in December, 1966, when anti-Maoist groups extended material benefits to workers in various major cities, and thus encouraged them to fight against the Cultural Revolution. In Shanghai, Shenyang and other cities, workers were incited by anti-Maoist groups to leave their working posts, and railway communications were disrupted. Similarly, highways were obstructed and work stopped on the docks. Maoist groups referred to these sabotage activities as "economism," which meant that the opponents had used public funds to buy off workers. It was reported that the Shanghai Party Committee, controlled by anti-Maoist groups, had signed an agreement to increase the wages and welfare benefits of workers a total of 30 million yuan.²¹

In order to cope with the situation, the Cultural Revolution was advanced to factories, mines and communes at the beginning of December, 1966. Red Guards were allowed to invade factories, and the struggle for seizure of power was intensified in the major economic centers. This change of policy in December resulted in a serious disruption of railways, seaports, factories and distribution channels during the following three months. As a result, in the first quarter of 1967, the effects of the Cultural Revolution were felt in four major areas of the economy.

DISRUPTIONS, 1967

First, there were work stoppages in various major industrial centers during December, 1966 and January, 1967. On January 11, 1967, the *People's Daily* admitted worker strikes in Shenyang (Manchuria), Sian (northwest China), Ch'engtu and Chungking (in southwest China), Wuhan (central China), Shanghai, Foochow, Hangchow (east China), and Canton (south China). In Shanghai, for instance, many major factories were involved. The famous Yang Shu Po (Yangtsepoo) power plant—the basic supplier of electricity to Shanghai—was struck for about a week. On January 9, 1967, Mao-

ist leaders in Shanghai published an urgent appeal calling for an immediate return of workers and government office cadres to normal work. All current accounts of official organizations and state enterprises, except those needed for production, for wages and for official expenses, were frozen. The same urgent appeals were also issued and widely broadcast by many provincial Maoist groups which signaled that uprisings of industrial workers had spread to quite a wide area.

Second, in several major centers disruption of the transport system, particularly that of railways and seaports, was also serious. In early January, 1967, railway connections between Shanghai and other major cities were completely paralyzed for a few weeks. Official sources also disclosed that in early January, many workers went on strike, and rail services were "semiparalyzed" on the northeastern lines which were controlled by the Harbin Railway Administration.²² Large numbers of freight cars were said to have been damaged and huge quantities of goods delayed, some for one month and some for two months, with locomotives idle for 18 days. Strikes on a smaller scale also occurred in Sian, Taiyuan, Kweiyang, Wuhan and Canton. On January 13, an appeal to railway workers of the whole country was issued in Peking calling railwaymen to return to work.²³ By the end of January, the situation on railways had not yet returned to normal. The Peking-Canton rail line, for instance, was not

(Continued on page 176)

Chu-yuan Cheng is the author of more than ten books and numerous articles on China's economy. His latest works include *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1966); *Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow: 1949-1963* (New York: Praeger, 1964), and *Communist China's Economy, 1949-1962* (South Orange, N. J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1963). He is now engaged in a research project on the machine-building industry of Communist China.

²¹ Radio Shanghai, March 2, 1967.

²² NCNA, March 23, 1967.

²³ *JMJP*, January 26, 1967, p. 3.

"Until its nuclear weapons system is operational," this specialist believes "Peking's military posture [will be] defensive. . . ." Citing Mao's own statements of policy, he concludes that "the current level of Peking's technology determines its doctrine, and its current doctrine reflects the current stage of its weapons development."

China's Military Posture

By S. M. CHIU

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THE PAROXYSMS of the past year gave every indication that the entire fabric of Chinese society was seriously disrupted and that the economic gains Peking had made since 1949 had been nullified. Yet on June 17, 1967, a hydrogen bomb was exploded at least a month ahead of schedule, touching off anxious speculation that Peking might test an intercontinental ballistic missile before the end of the year. This seeming paradox has made estimates of China's military capabilities extremely hazardous.

It is generally agreed that the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) is the largest conventional force in the world.¹ In the past ten years, the force level has remained at about 2.3 million men, excluding the half million men in the public security forces whose functions are best described as those of a national police. This force is backed up by tens of millions in the partially-armed militia.

Since 1949, the P.L.A. has undergone at least two significant organizational and doctrinal changes. First, during and after the Korean War, it was completely reequipped and its table of organization was revised with

Soviet assistance. This modernization process was largely completed by 1956. Then, shortly thereafter, the trend was reversed because of internal problems arising from the professionalization of the officer corps, the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet aid, the priorities given to nuclear development, and the costly updating of conventional weapons. In 1960, the military committee of the Central Committee (C.C.) decided to revive the revolutionary traditions of the P.L.A. instead of continuing to modernize it. The Guideline for National Defense Construction for 1961 adopted by the committee made it clear that the weapons then in use "would not be replaced until they are worn beyond repair."²

There is no evidence that the conventional-technical level of the P.L.A. has since been raised significantly. In fact, though Peking is reportedly self-sufficient in standard weapons, including light artillery, it is doubtful that it is prepared to expend any effort to raise the physical quality of its infantry until its industries can manufacture heavy and complex equipment or until the nuclear program is sufficiently developed to permit the diversion of funds for conventional armament.

The Chinese Communist air force is the third largest in the world, boasting about 2,500 planes. It is believed that most of

¹See Ralph L. Powell, "Peking Army Ruled From Party HQ," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 25, 1966; and Samuel B. Griffith, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), Ch. 13.

²General Political Department, Chinese People's Liberation Army, *Kung Tso Tung Hsün* (news release) No. 7, Feb. 1, 1961, p. 7.

them are obsolescent MIG-15's and MIG-17's. However, as early as 1957, P'eng Te-huai, then defense minister, hinted that China was producing her own jet fighters that were superior to the MIG-17's.³ It is reasonable to assume that her engineers and technicians are capable of copying the latest Soviet types. MIG-21's have been sighted by American and Nationalist Chinese pilots over the China coast. At the present time, the air force is still severely handicapped by the shortage of fuel, and the consequent inadequacy of pilot training has been repeatedly demonstrated by the kill-ratio of better than ten to one in favor of the Nationalists in skirmishes over the Taiwan Straits. The bomber force is believed to be mostly of World War II vintage and has limited operational capabilities.

Although the People's Republic of China has a young but capable shipbuilding industry, the navy is still essentially a coastal defense force, with about 200 craft of different sizes. The flagship is a 5,400-ton light cruiser which defected from the Nationalists in 1949. The cost in building a seagoing navy will remain prohibitive for the regime in the years ahead, and it can be expected at this point that Peking will concentrate instead on less expensive submarines of which there are reportedly 40, some equipped to fire short-range missiles above water. The navy also has an air arm, of unknown quantity.

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

The most significant development—the one that causes the greatest anxiety—is the rapid advance made by China in nuclear weapons. In less than three years, six tests have been conducted, including a nuclear-tipped short-range missile and a hydrogen bomb—all this by a country that only a few years ago was believed to lack all the requirements for such accomplishments. This success can be attributed to the regime's organizational skills, the

high priorities given to the program, and a core of brilliant scientists. It has been said that progress in the nuclear field could be made only at the expense of the economy, which was already threadbare. However, it should be remembered that: 1) China is not a typical underdeveloped country, as Professor John Lindbeck has pointed out,⁴ because although her per capita income is low her total productivity places her among the top ten industrial powers; 2) the nature of her state organization permits great flexibility and a wide range of options in regard to the concentration or allocation of resources without restraints imposed by either public opinion or higher priorities; and 3) Chinese scientists have benefitted from the experience (including the mistakes) of other nuclear powers and therefore could cut corners. China has consistently claimed that she would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and has pressed for destruction of all stockpiles. This is a natural position for a fledgling nuclear power especially when its delivery system is at best still primitive. United States defense authorities estimate that China will not be a threat to the United States until the mid-1970's. Whether Peking will acquire a greater sense of responsibility as it achieves full nuclear status is a question of consuming importance.

The most unique feature of the P.L.A. is its political control system.⁵ Since its inception in 1927, the army has been an arm of the party; and through a hierarchy of political officers parallel to the professional staff all officers and men have been subjected to intensive indoctrination in the party's ideology, through organized discussions and more often through what appeared to be cultural and recreational activities. Despite the difficulties inherent in the system—such as the inevitable conflict between the political and professional staffs—it has been an important contributory factor to the army's high morale.

In the years after Lin Piao replaced P'eng Te-huai as defense minister, the political control system was strengthened for various reasons. First, it is in the nature of communist dialectics that the P.L.A., like other institu-

³ *Chinese World* (San Francisco), July 30, 1957.

⁴ John M. H. Lindbeck, "Chinese Science: It's Not a Paper Atom," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 8, 1967, p. 38.

⁵ See S. M. Chiu, "Political Control in the Chinese Communist Army," *Military Review*, August, 1961.

tions in the country, should reflect the economic system. By 1959, the economy had moved from the cooperatives to a "higher form" of collectivization—the communes. Not only did the P.L.A. need education to accept this change, but it had to reflect the new social relationships that inevitably resulted from the change in the means of production. Lin Piao observed in 1959 that "quite a number of comrades lack a high degree of socialist consciousness, though they have certain aspirations for socialism."⁶ He added that the country was entering the stage of socialist construction, but that many people remained in the period of bourgeois democratic revolution.

Second, the professionalization of the officer corps in the preceding period had produced certain manifestations inimical to the interests of the party. If uncorrected, these tendencies, including what the communists called a "purely military point of view," might eventually divest the army of its "party character."

Third, as mentioned above, at about this time the military committee of the party decided to "freeze" the development of conventional arms in favor of a policy of selective development. Therefore, the army had to be "revolutionized" through political education in the invincible traditions of the P.L.A.

DISCONTENT IN THE P.L.A.

Finally, from 1960 to 1962, China suffered heavily from natural disasters and from the consequences of the Great Leap. Discontent was widespread among the soldiers, particularly those whose families were in afflicted areas.

To cope with all these problems, Lin Piao

launched a campaign in 1960 to produce so-called Four Good Companies throughout the P.L.A. Ostensibly to strengthen the basic units in the army, the aim of the campaign was to tighten the party's control, and to encourage retrenchment. At the end of the year, 5,000 companies were said to have earned the distinction of Four Good Companies, and the campaign was adjudged so successful that it has been renewed every year up to the present time. One outgrowth of the campaign has been the organized army-wide "creative study and application of the writings of Chairman Mao," which, by 1966, had become "the highest instruction for all work in the army."

To insure the success of the political control system, political attitude was made the sole criterion for promotion in 1964 in an effort to cultivate a generation of "successors to the revolution." In the celebrated ninth company of a certain unit, 21 soldiers were said to have been promoted to cadres by the end of 1966 on the basis of their achievements in studying and applying Mao's writings.⁷

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

There is no doubt that Mao effectively controls the P.L.A., and his control was the decisive factor in the latest and most serious upheaval in China, the Cultural Revolution.⁸ Starting as a seemingly harmless and routine campaign against nonproletarian ideas in art and literature in late 1965, the revolution erupted into a multi-faceted movement engulfing the entire party and army by the second half of 1966. The nature of this implosion is outside the scope of this article; but it may be pointed out that its roots can be traced to the incipient disagreement between Chairman Mao and a group headed by President Liu Shao-chi over economic policies in 1958–1959 when Mao was allegedly forced to relinquish his position as chief of state. For the next three years, it now appears, the party was directed by Liu with the support of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the general secretary of the party. When Mao returned to more active duties in 1964 he found that the party, particularly in economic matters, had been

⁶ Lin Piao, *March Ahead Under the Red Flag of the Party's General Line and Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p. 5.

⁷ Chen Chin-yuan, "Pa Lien Tui Chien She Cheng Mao Tse Tung Ssu Hsiang Ti Hao Hsueh Hsiao," ("Turn the companies into good schools for Mao Tse-tung's thought"), in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 13, October 1, 1966, p. 22.

⁸ For a complete survey of the Cultural Revolution, see Gene T. Hsiao, "The Background and Development of 'The Proletarian Cultural Revolution,'" in *Asian Survey*, June, 1967, pp. 389–404.

impregnated with "bourgeois ideas and practices," and the city of Peking itself was completely dominated by its mayor, P'eng Chen, another ally of Liu, making it prudent on Mao's part to leave for Shanghai in the middle of 1965.

What Mao did in Shanghai is not known, but it is a strange coincidence that the first salvo of the Cultural Revolution was fired in Shanghai in November, 1965, against Wu Han, historian and playwright. Soon after the attack on Wu Han, Lo Jui-ch'ing, chief of the P.L.A. general staff, quietly disappeared from the public scene.⁹ It was known that at least since 1959 Lo had been a supporter of Liu Shao-chi; and although he had also long been associated with Lin Piao he was nevertheless opposed to Lin's military line of "putting politics in command" to the detriment of professionalism. A Red Guard poster later charged him with the "crime" of having sponsored an All-P.L.A. Military Tournament in 1963 which emphasized technical skills at the expense of politics. Again, in May, 1965, he had obliquely suggested in a speech commemorating the defeat of Nazi Germany that in the interest of the revolution it was not impossible to negotiate with the imperialists. This speech brought upon him the indefensible charge of revisionism and the stigma of being anti-party and anti-Mao. It has even been suggested that Lo was an accomplice in a plot directed by Liu, Teng, and P'eng to stage a Hungarian-type *coup* against Mao in February, 1966.¹⁰

At any rate, P.L.A. involvement in the Cultural Revolution began with the army newspaper (*Chieh Fang Chun Pao*) editorial on April 18, 1966, which pledged the P.L.A.'s support of the revolution and enjoined the

entire army to take an active part "to raise still higher the banner of Mao's thought." It is not certain what happened in the several months prior to the eleventh plenum of the Eighth Central Committee held in the first part of August, 1966. According to a Yugoslav source, Liu and his friends were busy conspiring to convene the meeting on July 21 with the intention of impeaching Mao, who was still in Shanghai.¹¹ As Liu's power lay in his control of the party bureaucracy, he could have mustered enough members to do so. As the delegates began to arrive in Peking in mid-July, Lin Piao sent his troops into the city to take over the mass media and force the reorganization of the Peking party committee headed by P'eng Chen. According to the same source, Liu responded by asking Lo Jui-ch'ing to order Commander of the Sinkiang military district General Wang En-mao to send his units to the capital. Sensing the seriousness of the situation, Lin reinforced the Peking garrison and dispatched other units to intercept General Wang.

With the plot thus foiled, Mao flew back to Peking on July 18. The party meeting was rescheduled for August 1. Supported by the P.L.A. and Lin Piao, Mao personally led the criticism of Liu and Teng at the meeting which then adopted a 16-point resolution to serve as the guideline for the further development of the Cultural Revolution.¹² This was clearly a victory for Mao. After the meeting Mao could pursue the revolution in the name of the party and the reorganized Politburo and military committee.

SHIFTS IN COMMAND

The party plenum also reshuffled military personnel on three levels. On the highest level—the military committee—Lo Jui-ch'ing and Ho Lung were dropped as secretary-general and second vice-chairman respectively. Added to the committee were three former marshals of the P.L.A. long inactive because of age or disfavor: Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien and Liu Po-ch'eng. The first two were also elevated to membership in the Politburo. On the second level, two vice ministers and the director of the administra-

⁹ Chiang Chih-nan, "Chung Kung Chung Ti 'Ke Ming Tsao Fan' Hsing Shih," ("The Situation of seizure of power in the Chinese communist army") in *Studies on Chinese Communism*, Vol. 1, No. 2, February, 1967, p. 15.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹ Cited by Cheng Chi, "Wen Hua Ta Ke Ming Ti Ling Yi Mien Kuan" ("Another view of the Great Cultural Revolution"), in *Jen Wu Ping Lun* (Vancouver), No. 90, March 15, 1967, pp. 8-9.

¹² Resolution in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 10, August, 1966.

tive office of the ministry of national defense were removed, as were the chief of operations of the general staff, two deputy directors of the general political administration, the director of rear services, the commissar of the navy, and two deputy commanders of the air force. On the third level—the regional commands—the “purges” were effected by the “revolutionary masses” under each command by criticism, mass rallies and posters in the manner of the Red Guards. Those who were ousted included the commanders of the Chengtu, Lanchow, Sinkiang, Honan, Inner Mongolia and Chekiang military districts.

It is interesting to note that almost all the purged military leaders were long associated with Deputy Premier Ho Lung, some from the days of guerrilla warfare in the late 1920's. Probably many of them rose to high positions in the army through the influence and patronage of Ho. Over the years, these men, like Wang En-mao, had been stationed in remote and uninviting areas and it is not inconceivable that they had become disenchanted and responsive to conspiratorial suggestions. Since 1949, Ho Lung himself has not held any position of real consequence. He was assailed by the Red Guards in Peking as a bandit chieftain, which he was before he joined the communists. By the same token, while Ho's henchmen were being purged, Mao and Lin felt constrained to rehabilitate or bring out of retirement such erstwhile heroes as Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien and Liu Po-ch'eng, possibly to appease their own followers. How long they will stay in the limelight remains to be seen. All these developments suggest that factionalism could very well have been involved in the purges.

ANTI-MAO FORCES

Until the end of 1966, a reconciliation between Mao and Liu still seemed possible inasmuch as Liu had confessed his errors at a

party meeting called by Mao in October. By December, however, anti-Mao forces had re-emerged and mounted a furious counterattack, organizing their own version of the Red Guards and putting up their own posters and using Maoist slogans. Even some P.L.A. units, notably in Canton, discovered some anti-Maoist elements within their own ranks. Clashes were reported in wide areas and economic activities were disrupted by sabotage. Surprisingly restrained up to this point, Mao ordered the “suppression of and seizure of power from those in authority following the capitalist road” in the early days of January, 1967.

ROLE OF THE P.L.A.

Apparently, Mao had hoped that the P.L.A. would be kept out of the revolution, which he wanted to be a revolution from below. Also, as Professor Franz Schurmann has pointed out,¹³ by using the P.L.A., violence would escalate and the chances for compromise would diminish. After Mao's call to seize power, “rebel” groups mushroomed in all provinces and cities, all economic enterprises and educational institutions that were supposedly controlled by those “taking the capitalist road.”

Those P.L.A. units which were stationed in the areas were alerted by their political departments, and political officers were sent to establish liaison with the “rebel” groups. In most instances, Maoist “rebel” groups seized power from “those in authority following the capitalist road” without the direct support of the P.L.A., but always in the presence of fully-armed P.L.A. patrols. In a few cities, such as Kweichow and Heilungkiang, where the “reactionaries” put up stubborn resistance, the P.L.A. took more direct action.¹⁴ After power passed to the hands of the “rebels,” a new provisional organ of power—the revolutionary committee—was established, based on an alliance of revolutionary leading cadres (meaning the pro-Mao elements among those in authority), members of the revolutionary masses and the P.L.A.

It is still early to speculate on the true significance of the Proletarian Cultural Rev-

¹³ *The New York Review*, October 20, 1966, pp. 18–25.

¹⁴ See *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate), No. 3924, April 24, 1967, pp. 13–18; No. 3926, April 12, 1967, pp. 8–12.

olution. Past patterns suggest that as the turmoil subsides, radical economic changes or new forms of political power reflecting the dominance of the proletariat may emerge (perhaps something like the urban communes). Regardless of the outcome, the P.L.A., which played a key role, will perhaps emerge more powerful than ever.

ARMY AND PARTY

For the P.L.A., should Mao and Lin succeed in the Cultural Revolution, it will mean the perpetuation of the "proletarian line of army building." The army will remain under the control of the party and serve it as an instrument of proletarian power. Moreover, it will be guided by Mao's military thought, which emphasizes man rather than weapons, and political consciousness rather than technical skill. On the basis of recent developments, the following major trends may be noted:

1. In the relentless "politicization" of the P.L.A. after 1958, an evolving doctrine was apparent. If Peking was determined to become a nuclear power, it had few options in military policy. China could choose between a simultaneous development of both nuclear and conventional arms, or she could opt for a crash nuclear program while improvising a defense doctrine based on the use of existing conventional power to maximum advantage. From the commune movement to the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, with their military implications, it is evident that China chose the latter course, and any opposition was removed in the recent purges of top political and military leadership. While the nuclear program, carefully shielded from day-to-day political activities, has moved ahead rapidly, increasing attention has been given to "people's war" fought by regular armies with the support of a massive militia, in the manner in which the Chinese Communist armies of the past fought the

Japanese and the Nationalists. China cannot afford to risk destruction of her nuclear installations, but in case of an invasion the Chinese maintain that the invader would be "drowned in the human sea of 700 million." This appears to be Peking's doctrine in the present transitional period until its nuclear weapons system is operational.

2. If the above is valid, then Peking's military posture is defensive, for the kind of war that Mao's concepts envisage can hardly be waged effectively in aggressive action. However, in Mao's view, this is strategic defense, analogous to the first phase of China's war against Japan, in which guerrillas were constantly engaged in *offensive* action against the enemy in tactical situations. By extension, wars of national liberation may be regarded as tactical offensives which, according to Lin Piao,¹⁵ must be fought and won by the indigenous people themselves just as the guerrillas had to rely on their own resources.

3. Until China becomes a full-fledged nuclear power her leaders will continue to deprecate the atom bomb. The very nature of "people's war," according to the communists, precludes the use of weapons of mass destruction. However, such derogation of nuclear weapons should not obscure Mao's injunction that "in guerrilla warfare the guerrillas do not remain as such permanently but become gradually regularized as the war progresses." Again he has said: "We fight with whatever weapons we have; the type of war we fight depends on the type of weapons at our disposal."¹⁶ It is clear that the current level of Peking's technology determines its doctrine, and its current doctrine reflects the current stage of its weapons development.

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¹⁵ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," in *Hung Ch'i*, No. 10, September, 1965, pp. 1-28.

¹⁶ Mao Tse-tung, "Lun Ch'ih Chiu Chan" ("On Protracted War"), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, I (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1951), 440.

"While the final success of the Cultural Revolution is still in doubt," writes this specialist, "Mao seems to have reestablished his control in the Central Committee through the purges of his former supporters. . . ." If the revolution is successful, "it carries with it a fundamental transformation of Chinese society."

The Continuing Chinese Revolution

By HAROLD M. VINACKE

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By 1956, the first stage of the communist revolution in China was held (prematurely as it turned out) to have been completed. Consequently, Chairman of the Party Mao Tse-tung lifted the ban on criticism in his speech on "contradictions," in 1957. The fundamental nature of some of the criticisms showed that the intellectuals had not been completely "thought-reformed" into uncritical acceptance of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. Subsequently, those critics identified as potential sources of opposition were quickly dealt with. Some were liquidated, but most were put to work in labor camps to undergo further reeducation, thus bringing the situation back into balance and reestablishing the authority of the regime.

In 1958, the Great Leap Forward into communism through the establishment of the communes was undertaken. Its comparative failure was partly responsible for an apparent decline in Mao's influence within the party in the early 1960's. With industrialization and the development of a more advanced technology, a shift began to be made in education, which involved the creation of new professional classes with professional standards of competence unrelated to an essentially political party line. These developments in China, if unchecked, would have the same consequences for party doctrine that had already been observed in the Soviet Union. Mao, in decline, made plans to counter this possibility, withdrawing from

time to time from public activity for this purpose.

In 1959, before his decline, Mao had won an apparent victory in the party Central Committee when he succeeded in replacing the defense minister, P'eng Te-huai, with his firm personal supporter, Lin Piao. But the fact that he had to overcome substantial opposition, and to purge a long-time supporter with whose policies he disagreed, actually indicated a trend toward "collective leadership" and a lessening of his own authority.

Under Marshal P'eng, the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) had moved toward professionalism with an officer class, emphasizing training in the use of modern weapons. From Mao's point of view, this meant movement away from his military doctrine, which emphasized men rather than weaponry and called for an intimate relationship between officers and men, and between the P.L.A. and the peasant masses. The replacement of P'eng by Lin Piao was designed to bring about a change in military thinking, and to lay the groundwork for P.L.A. support of what was gradually to be developed into the Cultural Revolution.

Consequently, under Lin Piao, emphasis in training in the P.L.A. began to rest on "putting into application the thinking of Mao Tse-tung." That this met with continued resistance was indicated in 1965 by the purge of the chief of staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing, who had been appointed to that position at the time

of the elevation of Lin Piao. Progress had been made by that time, however, to the point where Lin Piao could issue his widely publicized "Instructions on Chinese P.L.A. work in 1966." The first of these was to "Regard the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung as the highest instructions on all aspects of our work in the whole army."¹

In delivering these instructions, Lin Piao said that "Chairman Mao's thought on army building always puts politics in the first place." The best weapon, according to Lin, "is not aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks or the atom bomb. The best weapon is the thought of Mao Tse-tung."

GOSPEL OF "RIGHT THINKING"

The campaign carried on intensively in the P.L.A. in 1966—sloganized as one to "put politics in the most prominent place"—was, in fact, a campaign to bring about complete adherence to the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. News media, the radio, movies and constantly-held group meetings were utilized to spread the gospel of "right thinking" and of action that had been successful because of the application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. "Heroes of the Mao Tse-tung era" were highly publicized.²

As the campaign to "put politics in the most prominent place" was extended from the P.L.A. throughout China, the same method was used. Workers in oil fields, in factories, and on the land were brought forward to testify to success when they applied the thinking of Mao Tse-tung and "followed the socialist rather than the capitalist road." People were encouraged to report on those who seemed to show bourgeois class tendencies, and "struggle" meetings were constantly held against those following the capitalist rather than the Maoist road. These were designed

to lead to self-criticism and an admission of guilt on the part of those not following and applying "creatively" the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. The drive was to put the proletariat in command through a leveling process and thus to complete the elimination of classes which had been begun in 1950 but which had not been completed. Party cadres as well as teachers and students were urged to learn from peasants and workers through participation in work in fields and factories. Peasants and workers were urged to assert their equality by engaging in literary pursuits. Literature and the arts, in the revealed thinking of Mao Tse-tung, had no justification except as they served exclusively the purposes of the revolution.

The direct attack on the intellectuals was launched at the end of 1965 and continued intensively in 1966, with an attack on the writings of the historian Wu Han, who was also a member of the Peking Municipal Committee. His historical play, "Hai Jui's Dismissal from Office," written in 1961, was attacked in November, 1965, in a lengthy criticism in the *Literary Gazette*. Wu Han was accused of fundamental error because he had portrayed Hai Jui as a good (though imperial) official who had stood up for the rights of the peasantry and had spoken for them. Historically, the play was accurate but from the standpoint of Marxist historiography it was considered heresy and thus was at odds with Mao's thinking on the subject of classes and the class war. Furthermore, Wu's critics found in the play a veiled attack on the top party leadership and on party doctrine through his use of historical analogy. On December 27, the *Pei-ching Jih-pao* published a "Self-Criticism Regarding 'Hai Jui's Dismissal from Office'" which Wu Han felt it expedient to offer in the hope of turning the attack from himself and from higher-placed supporters.

Higher-placed targets, however, immediately came under attack. The "academic viewpoint"—a critical search for an understanding of political, economic and social problems and a search for their solutions—was opposed to the thinking of Mao Tse-tung.

¹ NCNA (New China News Agency) (Peking, in English) broadcast November 26, 1965. For full text see also, *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), No. 3588, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, December 1, 1965.

² One such hero is Wang Chieh, a squad leader, whose serialized diary showed that his exploit was the result of his study of Chairman Mao's writings when he realized "that the goal of my life is to carry out the revolution."

It was held to represent a "bourgeois-capitalist" mentality which had to be eradicated and replaced with a "creative application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung." The "brain-washing" of the intellectual class and through it the nation had to be accomplished to clear the way for uncritical acceptance of Maoist doctrine.

From Wu Han the attack was extended to a campaign against Teng T'o (a writer and the secretary of the party committee responsible for supervising the cultural life of the country), who became the chief culprit in Peking. Together with Wu and Liao Mo-shan, he had collaborated in the preparation of articles published in the magazine *Ch'ien Hsien*, the Peking *Wan-pao* and the Peking *Jih-pao*.

Soon these articles ("Notes on Sanchia Village" and "Night Clauseries at Yenshan") were described in numerous articles, editorials and broadcasts as "big, poisonous weeds" and their authors were vigorously attacked as anti-party during the spring of 1966. The vigor of the attacks finally forced from the Peking *Jih-pao*³ what was in effect an apology, in the form of a self-criticism of its past policy. The editors confessed that they had learned a "very penetrating lesson" from this struggle:

we loosened our hold on class struggle and academic front; we left the door wide open for those people speaking for bourgeois interests within and outside the party to move in. . . . This is because we did not take any timely steps to place proletarian politics in command. . . . We are now determined to study Chairman Mao's writings seriously, eradicating poisonous weeds and correcting our errors on the basis of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

This self-criticism, however, did not end the campaign against Teng T'o and the intellectuals. The campaign was intensified in May, 1966. Subsequently, student activity brought a purge of the president and members of the faculty of Peking University, and their complete humiliation. The first of several reorganizations of the Peking Municipal Committee followed, with the purging of "bourgeois elements" of the committee, in-

cluding the mayor of Peking. From the Municipal Committee, the purge was extended into the party Central Committee and the Cultural Affairs and Propaganda ministries.

THE REVOLUTION PROCLAIMED

By June, the "Cultural Revolution" was proclaimed as such, being described in an NCNA (New China News Agency) broadcast of June 11 as "a great revolutionary movement aimed at consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and advancing the cause of socialism." The broadcast continued:

Hundreds of millions of workers, peasants and soldiers, revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals, armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, have been writing articles, holding discussions and putting up posters written in big characters to sweep away the ogres of all kinds of entrenched ideological and cultural positions, and to foster proletarian ideology and liquidate bourgeois ideology with great vigor.

To carry forward the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which had thus become an attack on the class of intellectuals entrenched in the university and middle school faculties, and on the mass media, literature and the arts, "work teams" were organized at Peking and Tsinghua universities and were sent to other centers to "struggle against" those who were not active in the movement to put into practice the thinking of Mao Tse-tung.

But unfortunately, as Premier Chou En-lai put it in August, 1966, the work committees "did not fully know their mission and committed a universal mistake." The nature of the mistake was indicated by the Central Committee's "Decision on the Cultural Revolution," adopted at the eleventh plenum and made public on August 8, 1966:

Responsible men [the resolution stated] of certain schools, units and work teams have been launching counter-attacks against the masses, writing big-character posters criticizing [the masses] or raising the slogan that opposition to them [the party work teams, etc.] means opposition to the party, socialism and the revolution.

THE RED GUARD MOVEMENT

This must be taken to mean that these "work teams" had not been sufficiently dras-

³ This was reported in full in a special section of NCNA (Peking, in English), April 16, 1966.

tic in their eradication of opposition to the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. Consequently, they had to give way to "revolutionary committees" made up of still more extreme youths, who forced "self-criticism" of the "work committees," leading them to admit that they had not been severe and thorough enough in prosecuting the Cultural Revolution. This led into the Red Guard movement, which spread from Peking throughout the country and from university to the secondary and even the elementary school students, who promptly went on a rampage throughout the country.

These successive developments indicate that there had been continued resistance to Mao, even in the Central Committee and at the highest level. Among those opposed to some of Mao's proposals (especially that the entire party apparatus, except for a select few designated by Mao, should be open to semi-public criticism through wall posters prepared under the direction of the "revolutionary committees") were Liu Shao-ch'i, chairman of the People's Republic, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, secretary-general of the party. Both, consequently, were downgraded and Liu was replaced by Lin Piao as the heir-apparent to Mao. Upgraded also was Ch'en Po-ta who was put in charge of the "cultural relations group" of the Central Committee, with Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, as his deputy.

Under this new direction, the "revolutionary committees," theoretically supervising the work of the Red Guards, went to work in Peking and on the party provincial committees in the big-character wall-poster campaign to terrorize all opponents of Mao's thinking. Aside from generalized attacks on "bourgeois and Khrushchev revisionists" in these "semipublic" aspects of the campaign against the party bureaucratic class, individuals were singled out to be "struggled against" in meetings with the revolutionary committee cadres. The purpose was to bring about public recantation of error and through self-criticism to bring individuals to a deeper understanding of the thinking of the "great leader," Mao Tse-tung, and to a creative and dynamic application of it. If the self-

criticism was penetrating enough to be accepted, the individual "struggled against" might be reinstated in the party, although usually he was downgraded. Reinstatement was usually assured if the self-critic was able to implicate others, transferring responsibility to his superiors for misleading him. This opened the way to successful "struggle" and the purge of those in higher echelons who might be accused of having resisted the creative application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung, as set forth in his *Selected Works*, or in the volume of *Excerpts*, millions of copies of which had been distributed. The safe-conduct badge displayed by those who "Held Aloft the Great Red Banner of the Thinking of Mao Tse-tung" was the book of excerpts.

By the end of 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i was under serious attack. References to him in big-character posters were not, at first, by name. It was generally understood, however, that he was the one described as the "No. 1 power holder taking the capitalist road within the party." After a series of such references, and a qualified (and thus unacceptable) self-criticism, Liu began to be attacked by name. In a "Preliminary Self-Examination," his daughter, Liu T'ao, joined the attack. An editor's note to her self-examination states:

Liu Shao-ch'i is the author of the bourgeois revolutionary line, the chieftain of China's revisionism and the ring-leader suppressing the great proletarian revolution . . . and Comrade Liu T'ao . . . is confronted with a severe test of whether she will resolutely follow Chairman Mao to make revolution, rebel against her revisionist father and become a proletarian revolutionary rebel or become a precious daughter of the bourgeois and die with Liu and Teng's bourgeois reactionary line.

Liu T'ao's lengthy "self-examination" reveals in detail the methods followed in developing the Cultural Revolution, reviewing the experience of one who participated as an elitist student leader and a member of a "work committee" under the guidance of accepted party leaders, especially of her stepmother and her father. Under their influence she confesses to have made errors, not regarded as errors at the time but which must be ac-

knowledge and corrected, now that a deeper understanding of the thinking of Chairman Mao has been reached. What is underscored in Liu T'ao's confession is that:

I am of the opinion that my father is really the No. 1 power holder taking the capitalist road within the party. For more than twenty years, he has all the time opposed and resisted Chairman Mao and the thought of Mao Tse-tung carrying out not socialism but capitalism. . . . In the current great cultural revolution movement, he suppresses the revolutionary movements, enforces bourgeois dictatorship, brings white terror into play, and adopts the attitude of disregarding Chairman Mao.⁴

COMPETITION FROM LIU

As the campaign against Liu intensified, more specific (although unwarranted) charges began to be published. But the great sin committed by Liu was that he had long been esteemed as second only to Mao in the development of Chinese Communist Party doctrine. What put him out of step with Mao were his writings, especially the volume on *How to be a Good Communist*. His emphasis was on the need for self-development, as contrasted with Mao's renewed insistence on conformity and revolutionary dedication. Liu's interest in self-development was a "bourgeois error" in the direction of individualism; the Cultural Revolution was directed toward proletarian revolution, and was designed to destroy the bourgeois class society which put emphasis on the individual and not on the mass. Consequently Liu had to be dealt with as the principal leader whose thinking was at variance with that of Mao. If that could be accomplished and if the scholar class could be harnessed to the Peking cart carrying exclusively the thinking of Mao Tse-tung, Maoism might well be perpetuated in China after Mao's death.

To consummate the Cultural Revolution and to overcome resistance to it, as has been pointed out, the Red Guards replaced the Young Communist League in the fall of 1966.

University and secondary school students, released from classes with the closing of schools, were encouraged to ferret out and attack all those suspected of bourgeois, nonproletarian class tendencies. Young people were brought to Peking from other areas throughout the country to be stimulated and instructed at huge mass meetings. They were given a chance to see their "great leader," Chairman Mao, and to listen to speeches by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and the Red Guard sponsor, Madame Mao (Chiang Ch'ing). As part of the ferment thus induced, their "revolutionary committees" took over the Ministry of Culture, in successive reorganizations. Their numbers, as well as their destructive activities, produced problems in Peking for the leadership which had sowed the wind and seemed to be reaping the whirlwind. The leadership sought to bring them under control and at the same time to widen the attack by sending them back home "to storm the provincial party committees." Thus the Red Guard disorders were spread from Peking to Shanghai, Canton and other centers.

Having used the Red Guards to terrorize the peasantry and those "following the capitalist road" both in and out of the party, the Maoist leadership faced the problem of overcoming the resistance which Red Guard activities had engendered, and bringing the youthful hoodlums themselves under control. At this point the P.L.A. was called on to restore order, while Chou En-lai instructed the Red Guards to sort out their membership and bring order into their ranks, transforming themselves into an organized and disciplined body to be viewed as a reserve to the P.L.A. Students were instructed to return to their respective institutions and resume their studies, but with a continuing special emphasis on the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. They were told to remain revolutionists and were to continue to advance the Cultural Revolution at home on a permanent basis.

A TRIPLE ALLIANCE

In the spring of 1967, the leadership also called for a "triple alliance" of the leaders of revolutionary mass organizations, representa-

⁴ The full text of Liu T'ao's "Preliminary Self-Examination" is published in *Current Background*, No. 881, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, May 26, 1967, pp. 25. The quotation is found on p. 14.

tives of army units and revolutionary leading cadres. According to a *Red Flag* editorial this "triple alliance" was to be the basis

on which to establish a provisional organ of power, preferably called a revolutionary committee, in places or units where power has been or is to be seized.

The power movement within the Cultural Revolution was indicated in the editorial which called "The Great People's Liberation Army"

the mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Chairman Mao's call on the People's Liberation Army actively to support the revolutionary Left is a matter of great strategic significance.

As pointed out above, the groundwork for support of the Cultural Revolution had been laid in the P.L.A. in 1965-1966 in accordance with Lin Piao's "Instructions" "to apply creatively the thinking of Mao Tse-tung" and to "put politics in the most prominent position."

While the final success of the Cultural Revolution is still in doubt, Mao seems to have reestablished his control in the Central Committee through the purges of his former supporters; he seems to be in the process of rebuilding power through "triple alliances" at the local level. Consequently, it is probable that the thinking of Mao Tse-tung will determine the immediate future. While Mao has tentatively rejected proposals that his thinking be considered "doctrine" or "dogma," it has clearly been his intention and desire to place it above questioning. If accomplished, this will give long-run significance to the Cultural Revolution. With the traditional leading class of scholars effectively denigrated, and with the present student generation setting the intellectual tone essentially through the use of slogans parroting excerpts from Mao's thought, no competitive ideological leadership may present itself in the near future.

Basic to the thinking of Chairman Mao (who was a dedicated revolutionary before mastering Marxist-Leninist doctrines) is the belief in the permanency of revolution until society has been completely proletarianized. Through permanent revolution, using per-

suation through self-criticism rather than coercion, as suggested by Chou En-lai (Mao's only unpurged early comrade-in-arms except for Lin Piao), bourgeois tendencies in thinking may be prevented. When classes have been eliminated and proletarian politics are in control, the path will be cleared for the creation of the communist society.

This aspect of Maoism is, to be sure, the communist orthodoxy from which the Russians deviated with Khrushchev revisionism. As the Russians departed from orthodoxy, so did the Chinese opponents of Mao in the early 1960's. Only Mao, his followers insist, remained faithful to communist doctrine and he must be accepted as the ideological successor to Lenin.

The doctrine of permanent revolution calls also for support of "wars of national liberation" and for their stimulation where no active "revolutionary situation" exists to be exploited. Thus Maoism, creatively applied in foreign relations, is a doctrine of instability and disorder in international affairs. "Peaceful coexistence" becomes doctrinal heresy. Wherever followed, it is held to mean alignment with the United States and its "imperialism" against the communist, antiimperialist camp.

But the Cultural Revolution has its deepest meaning for China and the Chinese rather than in terms of relations with the Soviet Union. If successful, it carries with it a fundamental transformation of Chinese society. The only Marxist-Leninist doctrine unacceptable to Sun Yat-sen and to the Chinese in

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Eleventh Plenary Session Communiqué, 1966

The eleventh plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China met from August 1 to August 12, 1966. At the close of the meeting, the session issued a communiqué including its views on the Cultural Revolution, the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, and its policies with regard to the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and the war in Vietnam. Excerpts from the communiqué of August 13, 1966, follow:

The 11th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Peking from August 1 to 12, 1966.

The 11th plenary session was presided over by Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Members and alternate members of the Central Committee attended. Also present were comrades from the regional bureaus of the Central Committee and from the provincial, municipal and autonomous region party committees; members of the cultural revolution group of the Central Committee; comrades from the relevant departments of the Central Committee and the government; and representatives of revolutionary teachers and students from institutions of higher learning in Peking.

The 11th plenary session, after discussion, adopts the "decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution."

The plenary session, after discussion, approves the important policy decision and measures concerning domestic and international questions adopted by the political bureau of the Central Committee since the 10th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee in September, 1962.

At the 10th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a correct analysis of the situation at that time and once again stressed the theory of contradictions, classes and class struggle in socialist society. This is the guide for the socialist revolution and socialist construction in our country.

Under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and under the guidance of the party's general line of going all out, aiming high and achieving greater, faster, better and more economical results in building

socialism, the people of our country have in the past four years unfolded the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experimentation, and have won great victories.

The people's communes have been further consolidated and developed. An invigorating revolutionary atmosphere prevails in the whole country, and the situation is one of a new all-round leap forward emerging.

The national economy of our country is developing steadily and soundly. The policy of readjustment, consolidation, filling out and raising of standards advanced by the party's Central Committee has already been successfully carried out. The third five-year plan started this year.

On the industrial front, not only have big increases been registered in the output and variety of products, but their quality has also greatly improved.

On the agricultural front, there have been good harvests for four successive years. The market is thriving, and prices are stable. The success of the three nuclear tests is a concentrated expression of the new level reached in the development of China's science, technology and industry.

During the past few years, an extensive socialist education movement has unfolded in the rural areas, the cities and the army. At present, a great proletarian cultural revolution unprecedented in history is mounting in our country.

The mass movement in which workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and cadres creatively study and apply Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works has ushered in a new era of direct mastery and application of Marxism-Leninism by the laboring people.

The plenary session fully approves the series of brilliant policies of decisive and fundamental importance put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung over the past four years. These policies consist mainly of the following:

¶On the question of applying the principle of democratic centralism and carrying forward and developing the revolutionary tradition of the mass line.

¶On the question of raising and training successors in the proletarian revolutionary cause.

¶On the call for industrial enterprises to learn from the Taching oil field, for agricultural units to learn from the Tachai production brigade, for the whole country to learn from the People's Liberation Army, and for strengthening political ideological work.

¶On the strategic principle of preparedness against war, preparedness against natural calamities and everything for the people.

¶On the question of breaking down foreign conventions and following our own road of industrial development.

¶On the question of system and deployment in economic construction and national defense construction.

¶On the call for the whole party to grasp military affairs and for everybody to be a soldier.

¶On the question of planning and arrangements for the gradual mechanisation of agriculture.

¶On the call for the People's Liberation Army and all factories, villages, schools, commercial departments, service trades and party and Government organizations to become great schools of revolution.

The plenary session stresses that the series of directives by Comrade Mao Tse-tung concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution are the guide for action in the present cultural revolution of our country; they constitute an important development of Marxism-Leninism.

The plenary session holds that the key to the success of this great cultural revolution is to have faith in the masses, rely on them, boldly arouse them and respect their initiative. It is therefore imperative to persevere in the line of "from the masses and to the masses."

The plenary session holds that the series of questions advanced by Comrade Mao Tse-tung over the past four years concerning socialist revolution and socialist construction have greatly accelerated the development and success of the socialist cause in our country.

The 11th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee holds that the present situation as regards the struggle of Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people throughout the world against imperialism, reaction and modern revisionism is excellent.

We are now in a new era of world revolution.

All political forces are undergoing a process of great upheaval, great division and great reorganization. The revolutionary movement of the people in all countries, and particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, is surging vigorously forward.

The activities of U. S. imperialism and its stooges in various countries against the people and against revolution are giving impetus to the revolutionary activities of all peoples. U. S. imperialism and its stooges in various countries appear to be powerful but are actually very weak. Taking the long view, they are all paper tigers.

The new leading group of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has inherited [former Premier Nikita] Khrushchev's mantle and is practicing Khrushchev revisionism without Khrushchev. Their line is one of safeguarding imperialist and colonialist domination in the capitalist world and restoring capitalism in the socialist world.

They are uniting with U. S.-led imperialism and the reactionaries of various countries and forming a new holy alliance against communism, the people, revolution and China. But this counterrevolutionary holy alliance is doomed to bankruptcy and is already in the process of disintegration.

The plenary session holds that our party's comprehensive public criticisms of Khrushchev revisionism over the last few years have been entirely correct and necessary.

The plenary session maintains that to oppose imperialism it is imperative to oppose modern revisionism. There is no middle road whatsoever in the struggle between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism.

A clear line of demarcation must be drawn in dealing with the modern revisionist groups with the leadership of the C.P.S.U. as the center, and it is imperative resolutely to expose their true features as scabs. It is impossible to have "united action" with them.

The plenary session points out that proletarian internationalism is the supreme principle guiding China's foreign policy. The session warmly supports the just struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism headed by the United States and its stooges and also supports the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries.

The plenary session most strongly condemns U.S. imperialism for its crime of widening its war of aggression against Vietnam. The session most warmly and most resolutely supports the "appeal to the people of the whole country" issued by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and firmly supports the Vietnamese people in fighting to the end until final victory is achieved in their war against U.S. aggression and for the national salvation.

The plenary session fully agrees to all the mea-

asures already taken and all actions to be taken as decided upon by the Central Committee of the party and the Government in consultation with the Vietnamese side concerning aid to Vietnam for resisting U.S. aggression.

The plenary session severely denounces the Soviet revisionist leading group for its counterrevolutionary two-faced policy of sham support but real betrayal on the question of Vietnam's resistance to U.S. aggression.

The Soviet revisionist leading group is pursuing a policy of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination and has been conducting splittist, disruptive and subversive activities within the International Communist Movement and the National Liberation Movement in the active service of U.S. imperialism. They cannot of course be included in this united front.

The 11th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee emphasizes that the intense study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works by the whole party and the whole nation is an important event of historic significance.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has inherited, defended and developed Marxism-Leninism with genius, creatively and in an all-round way, and has raised Marxism-Leninism to a new stage. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism in the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to worldwide victory. It is the guiding principle for all the work of our party and country.

The plenary session holds that Comrade Lin Biao's call on the People's Liberation Army to launch a mass movement in the army to study Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works has set a brilliant example for the whole party and the whole nation.

The method of studying Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works in a creative way, combining study with practice, studying first what is urgently needed

so as to get quick results, and making great efforts in applying what one studies, has proved effective and universally suitable and should be further popularized throughout the party and the country.

We must unite with all the people in the world who are against imperialism and colonialism and carry the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys through to the end.

Together with all the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists of the world, we must carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end and push forward the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat and the people of the world.

The 11th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee calls on all the workers, people's commune members, commanders and fighters of the People's Liberation Army, revolutionary cadres, revolutionary intellectuals, revolutionary teachers and students and scientific and technical personnel of the country to raise still higher the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, unite with all those who can be united, surmount the resistance coming from various directions, from the counter-revolutionary revisionists and the "left" and right opportunists, overcome difficulties, shortcomings and mistakes, cleanse the dark spots in the party and society, carry the great proletarian cultural revolution to the end, carry the socialist revolution to the end, and strive to fulfill the third five-year plan and build China into a powerful socialist country.

We must liberate Taiwan. We must heighten our vigilance a hundredfold and guard against surprise attacks from U. S. imperialism and its accomplices. Should they dare to impose war on us, the 700 million Chinese people under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party of China will certainly break the backs of the aggressors and wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, totally and completely.

China Explodes a Hydrogen Bomb

On June 17, 1967, Communist China announced the explosion of a hydrogen bomb, less than three years after the first Chinese atomic test on October 16, 1964. The communiqué announcing the successful test follows in full:

Chairman Mao Tse-tung pointed out as far back as June, 1958: "I think it is entirely possible for some atom bombs and hydrogen bombs to be made in ten years' time."

Amidst the song of decisive victory of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution of our country, we solemnly announce to the people of China and

the whole world that his brilliant prediction, this great call, of Chairman Mao's has been realized.

Today, on June 17, 1967, after the five nuclear tests in two years and eight months, China successfully exploded its first hydrogen bomb, over the western region of the country.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STUDIES OF CHINA

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY.

By JOHN GITTINGS. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. 331 pages, appendix, bibliography and indexes, \$8.50.)

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY IN ACTION.

By ALEXANDER L. GEORGE. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. 255 pages, notes and index, \$6.95.)

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION

ARMY. By SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, II. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. 398 pages, appendices, notes, bibliography and index, \$10.95.)

The People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.), a force that encompasses army, navy, and air force units, has, since its original formation in the 1920's, remained the single most important and stable element in the Chinese Communist government and in the party. The advent of the Cultural Revolution and the destruction of the previously monolithic party establishment has done nothing to change the P.L.A. image in Chinese Communist writings as the basic revolutionary and unifying element in the country. Seemingly impervious to attack by pro and anti-Mao rebels, the P.L.A. seems to occupy a unique position in the mosaic of Chinese organizations as the most politicized and professionalized pillar in Chinese society.

By being both "red and expert" the P.L.A., so far, has been able to play a relatively inactive role in the current Chinese upheaval, and remains engaged in any number of economic enterprises within China while continuing to maintain its state of ideological consciousness. Both its ideological strength and its quasi-social and economic roles have been severely tested over the years in China and, to a lesser but more critical extent, in Korea in the 1950

-1951 period. All three books cited above examine in varied detail the many aspects of the unique and changing characteristics of the P.L.A.—starting with its evolution from a rag-tail guerrilla organization to a cohesive and tightly disciplined mass-military arm.

In a fascinating study, Alexander George discusses the P.L.A. performance against United Nations troops on the battlefields of North and South Korea. By means of extended interviews with war prisoners and defectors, he reveals the many forms of sanctions employed by Chinese political officers to keep the individual soldier thoroughly devoted to his immediate task. The persistence of an "ethical-missionary" element in the discipline patterns of the Chinese military is shown to have roots extending far into the past history of Chinese warfare. The tradition of obedience, not divorced from a Confucian heritage, often makes for complete dedication in battle. The author shows that by molding and using a variety of techniques of control, the communist party has been able to make of the very ordinary Chinese soldier a "good communist soldier." How this process is developed and adapted in transforming the disengaged peasant into an ideologically conscious one is the burden of *The Chinese Communist Army in Action*.

In *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*, General Samuel B. Griffith takes a different approach to the problem of assessing P.L.A. capabilities and structure. He is interested in putting into historical context the many operations and field doctrines of the Army, insofar as the P.L.A. has clung to the military theories of Mao Tse-tung with unwavering dedication. His efforts suggest a prodigious amount of research and careful evaluation of long-range trends; unfortunately, a hastily written final chapter and epilogue on recent

events in late 1966 and early 1967 tends to be excessively speculative and of no special value to a student of military strategy.

John Gittings, formerly a research specialist in Chinese studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is likewise seized by the P.L.A.'s identification with the Chinese Communist Party's control mechanisms and its fulfillment of economic tasks. In *The Role of the Chinese Army*, Gittings' views represent careful insights into

the changing character of the P.L.A. since 1949, the fluctuating position which it occupies in the scale of national priorities, its relationship with the communist party, and its economic and social roles.

René Peritz
Indiana State University

CHINESE SOCIETY UNDER COMMUNISM: A READER. EDITED BY WILLIAM T. LIU. (New York: John Wiley, 1967. 496 pages and index, \$8.50.)

Who are the Chinese? How are Chinese institutions structured and managed? To what extent are Chinese notions of economic pragmatism and ideological commitment compatible with the economic future of Communist China? Efforts to answer these and related questions form the substance of this compilation. Parts I and II, "Introduction and Backgrounds of Communist China's Social Structure," relate in detail the established nature of China's legal codes and the functions of the gentry and family system in the traditional society. Part III, "The Control Apparatus," is an exposition of ideological instruments and tendencies within the Chinese Communist Party and the various military forces which affect decision-making at various governmental levels. Part IV, "Objectives of Control: The Planned Social Change," enumerates and discusses data bearing on developing Chinese trade patterns and economic shifts in urban, industrial and agricultural sectors. Part V, "The Institutional Consequences of Control," presents an exegesis on the place of

morality and ethics in the local educational and social patterns.

This book warrants wide circulation for it is an excellent primer on the application of Chinese methods to the universal problem of social change. The current tensions within China, in its quest to transform itself from an agrarian society towards an industrially conscious one, can be traced backward towards a number of "contradictions" which are operative at various levels in the Chinese polity. The editor and the many authors make a commendable and successful effort to examine the various positions and activities of the Chinese family and bureaucracy.

R.P.

CHINA. BY LOIS MITCHISON. (New York: Walker and Company, 1966. 232 pages, notes, bibliography, biographies and index, \$6.50.)

Lois Mitchison, one-time Southeast Asian correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, has written a sensitive analysis of modern China. She writes with enthusiasm about the "new men" of the Chinese Communist Party and the "new evangelists"—forerunners of the radical Red Guards. Combining wit and flashes of insight, she takes note of many aspects of the Chinese scene, specifically, the commune system, Chinese-American relationships, the defeat of the Kuomintang, the nature of the "least-favored vices" of the communist society, and the changing state of Sino-Soviet antagonisms.

A fine background study, this text combines a broad statement of factual information with a narrative of political melodrama.

R.P.

MAO TSE-TUNG IN OPPOSITION: 1927-1935. BY JOHN E. RUE (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966. 387 pages, bibliography, index, \$10.00.)

Close to the end of a detailed discussion on the political dynamics of the Chinese

Communist Party (C.C.P.), the author, a professor of political science at San Fernando State College, summarizes his major thesis: "The Maoist cult," he notes, "... was built on a struggle against the doctrinaire, mechanical imposition of Stalin's formulae to revolutionary China." This theme, while not especially new to followers of Asian communist movements, is meticulously evaluated, outlined and emphasized in twelve well researched chapters. In addition to presenting much material hitherto unpublished, the author has appended to his work five important C.C.P. documents on ideological objectives, including Mao Tse-tung's 1930 tract on conformity and regimentation: "Oppose Bookism."

R.P.

IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By FRANZ SCHURMANN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. 540 pages, bibliography and index, \$12.50.)

At a time when events in Communist China are unfolding with momentous and perplexing rapidity, we are indeed fortunate in the publication of this distinguished volume. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, by Professor Franz Schurmann of the University of California, is the most important book on China's internal political development since 1949 to appear in the past decade. It is an impressive achievement. Thoroughly researched, carefully organized and lucidly written, it provides reliable information on the functioning and effectiveness of Chinese Communist organizations.

Schurmann's thesis is that the key to communist power lies in the use of ideology and organization, both of which are new to China and both of which have arisen "because a traditional social system no longer existed to give unity to the society." He analyzes the organization of the party, the role of ideology, and the methods of management and administration. He sees the political and economic realms as the

arenas of struggle between the technocrats and the politicians, and relates these struggles to specific problems. Perceptive comparisons are made with the Soviet experience.

One would hope that this outstanding volume will soon be available in paperback, so that it may reach the broad audience it deserves.

A.Z.R.

FINANCING THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT BUDGET: MAINLAND CHINA 1950-1959. By GEORGE N. ECKLUND. (A monograph of the Committee on the Economy of China of the Social Science Research Council. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966. 133 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

In his monograph, Ecklund gives a clear and concise presentation, analysis, and evaluation of the revenue system of Communist China's government budget during the decade in which rapid economic development took place. The study contributes much to the understanding of the method by which the Chinese government mobilizes resources. In addition, it greatly facilitates the entrance of any interested student of economics into a challenging but underdeveloped area—research on the Chinese economy.

Katharine Hsiao
Indiana State University

THE FRONTIERS OF CHINA: A HISTORICAL GUIDE. By FRANCIS WATSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 224 pages and index, \$5.50.)

This is a very useful survey of the history of China's border problems with its neighbors: the U.S.S.R., the Mongolian People's Republic, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, India, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The author effectively uses this background to illuminate his discussion of the border conflicts which have erupted since the Communist seizure of power. The author con-

cludes that Chinese expansion has thus far been held in check by the resistance of neighboring states and by the need for a period of peaceful internal development. However, disciplined internal development has also required "the maintenance of external tension, the spectre of encirclement around an incompletely established perimeter."

Donald E. Smith

University of Pennsylvania

THE LAST MANCHU: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HENRY PU YI, LAST EMPEROR OF CHINA. EDITED, with introduction by PAUL KRAMER. Translated by Kuo Ying Paul Tsai. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. 318 pages, \$5.95.)

In telling his own story of adolescence and adulthood, Henry Pu Yi recounts a personal saga that suggests the dimensions of an epic. This is an unusual biography. The book was originally published in Communist China and represents one of the very few times a high Manchu dignitary was willing to write for a wide readership.

Undoubtedly, historians will be tantalized by the author's description of the Japanese occupation of Manchukuo (1934-1935), and of many well-known personalities, including the controversial Doihara, a leading figure in the Japanese military hierarchy; Seishiro Itagaki, chief of staff of the Kwantung army; and the "Young Marshal," Chang Hsueh-liang.

The book has been severely edited and the reader can only infer that much of what the author has to say on important events has been glossed over in the translation or forgotten in the retelling. R.P.

AN HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CHINA.

BY ALBERT HERRMANN. New edition edited by Norton Ginsburg. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1966. 112 pages, bibliography, index and list of Chinese characters, \$12.50.)

This atlas is based on the *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China*, first published

in 1935 by the Harvard-Yenching Institute. The original edition has long been out of print, and the appearance of this edition is welcomed by China students. The atlas has 64 maps in color—ten of which are new plates based on current available information. These new maps show contemporary population distribution, the transportation lay-out, the ethnolinguistic patterns, among other important aspects of the China mainland. K.P.D.

MAO TSE-TUNG. BY STUART SCHRAM. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. 351 pages, notes and index, \$7.95.)

Mao Tse-tung is a figure not unfamiliar to Stuart Schram, who has already edited a volume of Mao's political theories. His story of Mao brings us up to 1966, including a discussion of the Cultural Revolution. Schram concludes that the Great Proletarian Revolution is in part an outgrowth of Mao's past political thought, that "to rebel is in the tradition of us proletarian revolutionaries. . . . We rebelled in the past, rebel now and will rebel in the future!"

Included in the study are brief biographies of persons instrumental to Mao's development; and an evaluation of Mao Tse-tung as poet, politician, philosopher and peasant. This comprehensive volume offers fresh insight and understanding of modern China and her extraordinary leader. K.P.D.

CHINA UNDER MAO: POLITICS TAKES COMMAND. EDITED BY RODERICK MACFARQUHAR. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966. 508 pages and index, \$8.50.)

The selections in this compilation are taken from the first five years of *The China Quarterly*, which is edited by MacFarquhar. They give us a view of the goals, problems and progress of the People's Republic of China.

The book is divided into four sections. The first part covers "Politics and Organization" in the government (rural and urban) and in the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.). The second section discusses the "Economic Development" in industry and agriculture with, of course, a certain focus on the Great Leap Forward. Part three explores the world of Chinese "Culture and Society"—ranging from an article on communist education to one on "The Literary World of Mao Tse-tung." The final section centers on the "Foreign Relations" of the People's Republic.

The contributions are written by well-known and influential Sinologists, including John W. Lewis, Franz Schurmann, S. H. Chen, Morton Halperin, Benjamin Schwartz and several others. K.P.D.

WARLORD: YEN HSI-SHAN IN SHANSI PROVINCE. 1911-1949. BY DONALD G. GILLIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 334 pages, bibliography and index, \$9.00.)

In this highly readable account of Yen Hsi-shan, warlord of Shansi Province until the Communists took over, Donald Gillin offers a clear and vivid picture of the era. Yen is pictured as a rather weak warlord
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CHINA AND HER NEIGHBORS

THE FAR EAST. BY PAUL H. CLYDE and BURTON F. BEERS. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966. 494 pages and index, \$8.95.)

This reissued and up-to-date text on the Far East is a fine introduction to the historical forces that have shaped modern Asia. After critically examining the many currents that have forced Chinese and Japanese nationalist movements to the surface, Professors Clyde and Beers come to a number of not too surprising conclusions. They maintain that Asian policies of neutralism and nonalignment are essential if the nations rimming the China mainland wish to survive as viable and independent

territorial units. Hence the Southeast Asian region, on the whole, is likely to continue to resist becoming involved in the cold war. Non- or disengagement, in turn, becomes a *sine qua non* for the individual state's "own political salvation." A good bibliography supplements an equally good index. R.P.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF EAST ASIA. BY C. P. FITZGERALD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. 295 pages, general bibliography, maps, illustrations and index, \$7.00.)

A Concise History of East Asia is an unusually successful attempt to glean the most pertinent facts from an overwhelming body of data. Mr. FitzGerald has written a multifaceted but balanced narrative, based on an interesting blend of archeological and other source material, which is both readable and highly informative.

The first four chapters of this work deal with China, tracing the history of that country from 1700 B.C. to 1950 A.D. The next three chapters concern Japan, while Chapter 8 covers the much-neglected history of Korea. The final three chapters paint in bold strokes the major changes in Southeast Asia throughout the centuries. Wherever possible, the author has shown the interconnecting influences between the events in these different regions especially in regard to China's impact on her neighbors.

If there is any fault with this book it lies only in the author's choice of subject—attempting to cover such a vast period of time in less than three hundred pages of necessity requires omitting 95 per cent of the material which would interest most scholars. However, Mr. FitzGerald succeeds admirably in presenting a good introduction to the history of East Asia, and even accomplished scholars in the field may find this book refreshing.

Kenneth Lieberthal
Columbia University

CHINA IN ASIA

(Continued from page 134)

the lists. There is very little real probability of a major Chinese quarrel with either of these powers. From India, China has taken what she considers her own, and what she wanted—certain frontier areas and passes. It is doubtful (although much Indian opinion will not agree) that China has any further ambitions in respect to India. The Indian Communist Party does not offer a very hopeful prospect in the country as a whole, in spite of local success in Kerala. China would certainly not want to take large Indian territories and be responsible for their administration; her reluctance to be led by military success into such a position was clearly demonstrated by the unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal from invaded regions which the Chinese carried out immediately after their victory in 1962.

The Chinese attitude toward Japan is ambivalent. Trade is important, and a large Japanese commercial and industrial lobby—capitalist rather than socialist—works actively and openly for an expansion of trade with China and diplomatic relations with Peking. The Japanese Communist Party is small, weak, and not likely to become a serious revolutionary force. Having attained an industrial strength through capitalism, Japan is fundamentally different from the other nations of the Far East. It has not at present the makings of a revolutionary situation, and the Chinese know very well that foreign encouragement would hamper rather than help the Japanese Communist Party. Japan is not a military power of the first rank, and there is strong antimilitarist sentiment in the country. This is reassuring for China; but Japan has the industrial and technological strength to become a nuclear power swiftly and effectively. In such event, Chinese views could change. The memory of past invasions still exists. China clearly aims to encourage those forces in Japan which wish to loosen the ties with the United States and assume a policy of full neutrality; it is the best China

can hope for in Japan, and it is not a vain hope.

This assessment of China's role in Asia is based on what is known of present policy and resources, not on what policy may be or what further resources could be available ten years from now. Ten years is a long time; in that period, on past experience, there can be surprising reversals of alliances, wholly unexpected developments, changes of regime and of strength. The enemy of yesterday is often the friend of today. Present policies and power seem to preclude any dramatic Chinese assault upon the Western nations, although they favor a constant attrition and undermining of Western power in the Far East. The gazer into the crystal ball can see only a cloudy and uncertain picture of the future.

CHINA'S AMERICAN POLICY

(Continued from page 140)

Furthermore, by following the strategy of conflict management, China has not been forced to pay the price of Sino-Soviet cooperation which the Liu-Lo-P'eng line would have entailed.

The Mao-Lin-Chou strategy is essentially a cautious strategy, but it should not be inferred that China will under no circumstances intervene in Vietnam. Nor do China's leaders totally rule out the threat of a possible war with the United States. For this reason, China continues to give its maximum attention to war preparedness in both the conventional and the nuclear fields. Because of the importance of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) in internal Chinese power relationships, the modernization of weapons systems capability probably has a better chance than other sectors of the Chinese economy. Politically, while the P.L.A. had been "purified" by intensive campaigns prior to the Cultural Revolution, it is doubtful that complete politicization and reliability was ever achieved in its ranks.

Three nuclear tests in 1966 and a thermonuclear weapons test on June 17, 1967, prove

that the Mao-Lin stress on guerrilla warfare does not preclude a strong emphasis on nuclear weapons. Moreover, they also demonstrate that China is determined to correct the serious imbalance in the Sino-American power relationship. Until this imbalance is rectified considerably, a non-interventionist policy will probably continue. In spite of the bland reactions to China's thermonuclear test from Western sources, China's progress in this sphere is rapid and ahead of schedule. It can also be asserted that the Chinese nuclear deterrent is specifically aimed at gaining relative freedom of action in foreign policy without risking instant and total destruction by a nuclear superpower. The Chinese have interpreted American statements that no sanctuary will be allowed to China if it intervenes in Vietnam to mean that there is no possibility of a limited war of the Korean type between a nuclear and a nonnuclear power. Thus, all Chinese statements emphasize the value of nuclear weapons to break the nuclear monopoly of the superpowers.

By 1970 China may possess a minimum nuclear deterrent against the superpowers. Until then, the Chinese will follow the minimum risk policy of conflict management with both superpowers and especially with the United States. Beyond this, what lies ahead depends on so many domestic and international variables that no accurate predictions can be made. War by escalation or accident cannot be ruled out, but such a war would be entered into most unwillingly by both the Chinese and the Americans.

CHINA'S ECONOMY

(Continued from page 154)

completely cleared until March 5, while army units were ordered into service on the rail-

ways to break up railway freight jams.²⁴

The strike in the Shanghai dockyard was officially disclosed in the *People's Daily*²⁵ and was later confirmed by Japanese trade companies which reported delays of up to two weeks in the loading and unloading of vessels at Shanghai in early January.²⁶

Third, commercial distribution channels were disrupted. During August and November, 1966, more than 50 million Red Guards and other so-called "revolutionary groups" were moving from one city to another and 11 million went to Peking. The large-scale movement of Red Guards and revolutionary groups caused great disturbance in all fields of transport and supplies of essential food-stuffs, raw materials and construction materials were interrupted. Due to the sudden payments of extra wages and bonuses to workers and employees by anti-Maoist groups, toward the end of 1966 there was a sharp increase in consumer demand and as a result prices in many cities were pushed upward. During mid-February, 1967, a number of directives issued by Maoist groups in various provinces reported a breakdown of the collective marketing and state procurement system. There were fairly widespread reports from official Chinese sources that in some localities, peasants sold materials procured and allocated by the state. In other cases, local officials opposing the Cultural Revolution distributed to peasants farm products earmarked for the state or for collective granaries. In Yunnan, for instance, radio reports implied that market supplies in February were drying up as a result of hoarding.²⁷

Fourth, widespread disorder existed in the rural areas also. Peasants in a number of localities seized food stocks and even seed grains from collective storehouses, broke up their collective work teams, and refused to meet their quotas of grain sales to the state. There were also signs of unrest in the countryside where peasants turned violently against party cadres. As a result of this disorder, many rural cadres were wavering, wanted to resign, or remained inactive.²⁸

Although much of the disruption in industrial production and transportation occurred

²⁴ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, April 13, 1967, p. 85.

²⁵ *JMJP*, January 17, 1967, pp. 1-2.

²⁶ *The New York Times*, January 15, 1967.

²⁷ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 13, 1967, p. 85.

²⁸ *China News Analysis*, Hong Kong, No. 645, January 27, 1967.

during the first two months of 1967 in a sporadic manner and did not continue after the army assumed control and supervision in major industrial plants, railways and seaports, one might expect that the ill-effects in the economy occasioned by the Cultural Revolution will be more serious in 1967 than in the year before.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The long-term impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese economy will to a great extent depend on the result of the current power struggle. If the Maoist group consolidates its control, political terror and military discipline rather than economic reasoning and material incentive might be used to guide the national economy. This new orientation would put the national economy back on the old tracks of the great leap and the commune which are bound to lead to a period of chaos and dislocation. On the other hand, if others with perhaps a more pragmatic approach steer the wheel, the national economy may follow a more moderate and balanced development pattern. Although the outcome of the power struggle is far from decided, the regime faces several serious problems.

In the first place, with the purge of dozens of the nation's top economic planners and administrators such as Po I-po, chairman of the state economic committee, Ch'en Yun, top policy-maker in economic affairs, and Yeh Chi-chuang, minister of foreign trade, the nation's economic planning system is semiparalyzed.

The men who are now being purged are generally credited with (a) being the architects of the central planning system which emerged after 1953, and (b) the country's economic recovery from the disaster of the great leap. Their wholesale expulsion has created a vacuum which will affect the functioning of the central planning system. Numerous reports hint that production plans for 1967 suffered some degree of delay. In a speech delivered on January 18, 1967, Chou En-lai implied that one major cause for the

breakdown in the finance and trade systems had been the "lack of strong central guidance." When army commissioners and political agitators replace technical and administrative experts, dislocations in the national economy become almost inevitable.

Second, since the launching of the Cultural Revolution, there is a new tendency to downgrade expertness and overemphasize political zeal. Workers are again being encouraged to challenge "authority," and technical constraints in production are generally ignored. The resurgence of an "antiscientific" and "antitechnical requirement" psychology, which had inflicted incalculable damage in production during the 1958-1959 Great Leap, could again lead to a breakdown in the normal operation of the economy of the People's Republic.

Third, during the past year, as the Cultural Revolution was extended to the communes, great confusion arose in the countryside. Commune-level officers who viewed the Cultural Revolution as a direct threat to their positions either mobilized support to resist the onslaught or were frightened into impotence. The result has been a decline in peasant incentives to work in the collectivized production sector and a lack of leadership at the local level.

In short, despite the regime's ability to ensure the normal functioning of economic activities during the first year of the Cultural Revolution, the disruptive effects of the political turmoil in some parts of the national economy seemed conspicuous in 1967. If the current situation continues, the national economy could be damaged for years ahead. Although the precise effects on production are still difficult to assess, it is obvious that so long as the political struggle continues, no definite long-range development plan can be formulated and implemented. The Third Five Year Plan, which officially started last year, may suffer the same fate as its predecessor; that is, it may either be completely abandoned, or it may become no more than a series of loosely-interconnected targets which do not add up to a long-term plan.

CONTINUING REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 166)

general has been that of class war. Attempts to apply the concept in the land reform movement, without explicitly proclaiming it, were only partially successful. Landlords as a class were largely eliminated, but they were regarded as absentee and exploiting landlords rather than as members of a class in society. Furthermore, in the circumstances of the Chinese revolution, it proved impossible to develop industry and maintain agricultural production without toleration of a managerial, a professional and a bureaucratic class. Also the traditional family system, deeply rooted, although weakened in the process of revolutionary change, has not been destroyed, as it must be if bourgeois thinking is to be overcome, if not today, then tomorrow or the next day.

If it is successful, the emphasis on the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and on a continuing revolution to eradicate classes (especially the scholar-professional ruling class), which is the essence of the Cultural Revolution now under way, will revolutionize China through the creative application of the thinking of Mao Tse-tung. Thus he will be immortalized.

H-BOMB ANNOUNCEMENT

(Continued from page 169)

The success of this hydrogen bomb test represents another leap in the development of China's nuclear weapons. It marks the entry of the development of China's nuclear weapons into an entirely new stage.

The Chinese people are proud of this, and the revolutionary people the world over will also take it as a matter of pride. With happiness and elation, we hail this fresh great victory of Mao Tse-tung's thought, this fresh splendid achievement of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the party and the Cultural Revolution group under the Central Committee extend the warmest congratulations to all the commanders and fighters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the workers, engineers,

technicians and scientists and the other personnel who have been engaged in the research, manufacture and testing of the nuclear weapons.

Under the correct leadership of the party's Central Committee, Chairman Mao and his close comrade-in-arms, Comrade Lin Biao, they have held high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, kept proletarian politics in the fore, creatively studied and applied Chairman Mao's works, firmly upheld the proletarian revolutionary line represented by Chairman Mao, resolutely opposed the revisionist line of the handful of top party persons in authority taking the capitalist road, grasped revolution and promoted production, given play to their collective wisdom and strength, cooperated closely with each other, surmounted all difficulties in the revolutionary spirit of "seize the day, seize the hour" and, opening up a path of their own, have insured the smooth success of this hydrogen bomb.

Chairman Mao has said: "In the fields of the struggle for production and scientific experiment, mankind makes constant progress and nature undergoes constant change; they never remain at the same level. Therefore, man has constantly to sum up experience and go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing."

It is hoped that the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the broad masses of the revolutionary workers and staff and the scientific and technical personnel—following these teachings of Chairman Mao and responding to the call of Comrade Lin Biao to "strengthen the revolutionary spirit, scientific approach and sense of organization and discipline"—will guard against conceit and impetuosity, continue to exert themselves and win new and still greater merit in accelerating the development of our country's national defense science and technology and the modernization of our national defense.

China has got atom bombs and guided missiles, and she now has the hydrogen bomb. This greatly heightens the morale of the revolutionary people throughout the world and greatly deflates the arrogance of imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries.

The success of China's hydrogen bomb test has further broken the nuclear monopoly of United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism and dealt a telling blow at their policy of nuclear blackmail.

It is a very great encouragement and support to the Vietnamese people in their heroic war against United States aggression and for national salvation, to the Arab people in their resistance to aggression by the United States and British imperialists and their tool, Israel, and the revolutionary people of the whole world.

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MOSCOW AND THE CRISIS

(Continued from page 147)

Guards, held in Peking from August to December, eleven and a half million adolescents viewed their leader, Mao Tse-tung, and his "closest comrade in arms," Lin Piao; screamed their hysterical adulation; and were sent out into the country to attack and crush the regular party organization, the "monsters and demons who opposed the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." In Peking, the attack gradually focused on the highest party leaders, Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who must have been deprived of actual power after the August meeting but who became the chief target of the demonstrators as "the top party leaders in authority who are taking the

capitalist road." Accused of the crimes of "revisionism" and return to capitalism, Liu and Teng were linked to the backsliding Soviet leadership.³⁶

In October, the Soviet ambassador and other East European envoys walked out of the Peking celebration rally in protest against Lin Piao's attack on the Soviet leadership, and for the first time Soviet leaders did not send greetings on China's national day. Intensified anti-Soviet demonstrations by the Red Guards before the Soviet embassy in Peking were followed by provocative actions by Chinese students in Moscow. The rough handling of these students by Soviet police, followed by their expulsion, led to new anti-Soviet riots in Peking.³⁷ Numerous Soviet newspaper articles expressed open antagonism against the Cultural Revolution, which had "nothing in common with revolution, culture, with Marxism or the policy of socialism." According to Chinese count, more than 1,500 anti-Chinese articles appeared in *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and 12 other Soviet papers during this time.³⁸

THE SOVIETS TAKE SIDES

At first these comments were in general terms, but by the end of the year the Soviets openly sided with the regular Chinese party leadership and opposed Mao and his Cultural Revolution as "nihilistic" and "anti-Socialist." The Red Guards were "young gangsters," and deep sympathy was expressed for the regular party leaders who had fallen victim to their attack. This stand was given official sanction by the Central Committee meeting of the Soviet party on December 13, 1966.

It was then restated by Leonid Breznev, Aleksei Kosygin and Podgorny in speeches directed not only to the international communist world but specifically to party activists in meetings called in the cities and military districts of the border regions.³⁹ Whichever move was primary, Mao's open attack against Liu and Teng, or the Soviet support of these leaders, the two were obviously interrelated, as demonstrated by the coincidence of timing of both moves in December, 1966. The seri-

³⁶ See *Tokyo Mainichi*, April 6, 1967, morning edition, for the full text of the accusations against Liu Shao-ch'i, the "50 offenses committed by Liu Shao-ch'i" written up as a wallpaper by the "ching-kangshan corps" of the Peking Tsinghua University Red Guards. It became the basic material for the offensive against Liu. Liu Shao-ch'i, together with Teng Hsiao-p'ing, was also accused by Chou En-lai of having been affected by Khrushchev.

³⁷ See *The New York Times*, October 1, 1966, p. 1-2, and October 26, 1966.

³⁸ See NCNA, April 22, 1967.

³⁹ For the text of the *Pravda* article of November 27, 1966, see *The New York Times*, November 28, 1966, pp. 10-11. The decision of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee of December 13, 1966, "on U.S.S.R. international policy and the C.P.S.U. struggle for the cohesion of the Communist movement" contains the following sentences: "The latest developments in China and the decisions of the 11th Plenary Meeting of the C.C.P. Central Committee show that the great-power, anti-Soviet policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group has entered a new dangerous stage. . . . This policy and these actions damage the interest of socialism, the international workers and liberation movement and the socialist gains of the Chinese people itself and objectively assist imperialism. The plenary meeting of the Central Committee confirms the immutability of our party's course [aimed—ed.] at friendship and international solidarity with the Communist Party of China and with the Chinese People's Republic. At the same time the plenary meeting finds it necessary to expose resolutely the anti-Leninist views and the great-power, nationalistic course of the present Chinese leaders and to step up the struggle in defense of Marxism-Leninism and the general line worked out by the Moscow Conference of 1957 and 1960." See *Tass International Service* in English, December 13, 1966. For the statements by Breznev, Kosygin and Podgorny see *The New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1967. See also NCNA, April 22, 1967.

ousness of the situation was underlined by the report of heavy Soviet troop concentrations on the inner Asian border.

In 1967, the propaganda war continued. In March, both Breznev and Kosygin restated their deep concern with the Great Cultural Revolution that suppressed socialism in China and was "a great national tragedy." Each side vastly intensified broadcasting in the language of the hostile communist brother country and jammed the other's transmission.⁴⁰

Yet common Communist interests still seemed to be understood. In March, reports that Soviet war material was now reaching Vietnam through China without obstruction led to the belief that an understanding had been reached.⁴¹ Both countries continued to give their support to Vietnam even while accusing each other of sabotaging the war effort there.

In spite of the struggle for world communist leadership, the Sino-Soviet conflict is still contained within the framework of communism. The final outcome remains in abeyance as much as does the outcome of the power struggle within China herself. If the regular party leadership should regain control after Mao's death or failure, the Soviet backing received in its hour of trial would obviously strengthen an inclination to reestablish the Sino-Soviet partnership.

Even if Mao's military supporters eventually become his heirs, a realistic appraisal of military needs may also lead them back to the fraternity of communism and to military cooperation with Moscow, once Mao's personal ambition has disappeared with his death. If "revisionist" Moscow and "nihilistic" Peking are still bound by the common communist objective of world revolution, a final break between the two appears possible

⁴⁰ On February 16, in an article in *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist Party condemned Mao Tse-tung as a "renegade" and called on the Chinese people to overthrow him and "his henchmen" and return China to the "Socialist Community" (see *The New York Times*, February 16, 1967, p. 1). For the broadcasting battle see *The New York Times*, March 3, 1967, p. 1.

⁴¹ See *The New York Times*, April 12, 1967, pp. 1-2.

only if an anticommunist rising should succeed and this common communist objective be abandoned.

H-BOMB ANNOUNCEMENT

(Continued from page 178)

Man is the factor that decides victory or defeat in war. The conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defense, with the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear weapons.

We solemnly declare once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say.

As in the past, the Chinese people and Government will continue to make common efforts and carry on an unswerving struggle together with all the other peace-loving people and countries of the world for the noble aim of completely prohibiting and thoroughly destroying nuclear weapons.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 174)

of a weak state who constantly jockeyed for power, making and breaking alliances with other warlords to keep himself and his poverty-stricken state on the winning side. At the same time, he tried to strengthen the economy of his province, to interest private investors in modern methods, and to awaken a capitalist spirit of some sort in the people. Finally, his faith in capitalism shattered by his failures, Yen swung to Naziism and, eventually, to communism for guidance. Following the Russian example, he reorganized the educational system of the province and instituted the concept that wages should be paid according to need, not ability.

Unfortunately, corruption and persecution lost Yen peasant support, and when the Communists invaded Shansi, the peasants turned to them. Elderly and disillusioned, he finally fled to Formosa. Gillin's account of Yen's successes and failures makes more vivid our picture of the warlord era.

T.L.T.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of July, 1967, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

By MARY KATHARINE HAMMOND

Instructor of History and Government, Ohio Northern University

INTERNATIONAL

Central American Common Market

July 26—Representatives of the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association announce the establishment, in principle, of a coordinating committee linking the two groups, which involve 16 nations. This contact is viewed as the first step toward the establishment of a Latin American Common Market.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 28—Sweden makes formal application to join the European Common Market.

European Organization for Nuclear Research

July 21—France, West Germany and the European Organization for Nuclear Research sign an agreement to share equally the construction cost of a \$19.5-million machine designed to photograph smashed atoms.

Middle East Crisis

July 2—The Israeli government announces that refugees from the west bank of the Jordan River will be permitted to return if they do so by August 10. A Jordanian calls the offer "an empty propaganda gesture."

July 4—An emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly rejects a Yugoslav resolution, backed by the Soviet Union, calling for unconditional Israeli withdrawal from

territory conquered from the Arab states. The vote is 53 to 46, with 20 abstentions. A two-thirds majority—82 votes—is needed for passage.

The General Assembly, by a 99-0 vote, with 20 abstentions, asks Israel to rescind its decision to annex the old part of Jerusalem.

Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny ends an Iraqi visit. A joint communiqué stresses Arab-Soviet friendship and says the talks dealt with "steps to be taken to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression."

U.N. Secretary General U Thant proposes to Israel and the United Arab Republic that the U.N. supervise the cease-fire in the Suez Canal zone.

July 6—U.N. Secretary General U Thant appoints Sweden's Nils-Goran Gussing to investigate the status of war prisoners and refugees of the Arab-Israeli war.

July 10—The U.A.R. accepts the proposal to station U.N. observers on both sides of the cease-fire line along the Suez Canal.

King Hussein of Jordan and President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria meet in Cairo with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Twelve Soviet naval vessels arrive in Alexandria and Port Said for a week-long friendship visit.

July 11—Israel agrees to the establishment of U.N. observers along the Suez cease-fire line. The government rejects a U.N. General Assembly resolution asking annulment of the unification of Jerusalem.

July 14—The General Assembly, 99-0, with 18 abstentions, adopts a Pakistani resolution again requesting Israel to "desist forthwith"

from altering the status of Jerusalem.

U.N. Secretary General Thant charges Israeli troops with "looting and the removal of property" from U.N. Emergency Force headquarters in Gaza.

July 15—A U.N. spokesman says that "through inadvertence" the Thant report on the U.N. Emergency Force omitted an Israeli pledge that all involved in looting had been court-martialed.

July 16—The leaders of the U.A.R., Algeria, the Sudan, Syria and Iraq announce in Cairo that they have agreed on steps to eliminate the consequences of Israeli "aggression."

July 17—Israel tells the General Assembly that a condition for peace talks with the Arabs is the recognition of Israel's "statehood, sovereignty and international rights."

After an unexplained delay, U.N. observers begin supervising the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire along the Suez Canal.

July 19—Israel tells the General Assembly that it will not withdraw its forces from Arab territory until the Arab states establish normal relations with Israel.

July 21—The General Assembly votes to turn the Middle East crisis back to the Security Council.

July 23—U.A.R. President Nasser tells Egyptians he is reorganizing the armed forces to continue the struggle against Israel. He warns the nation of economic hardships but says there will be no surrender to Israel or the West.

July 26—Israeli officials are informed by U.N. Truce Supervisor General Odd Bull that Egypt has rejected his suggestion that both countries refrain from navigation on the Suez Canal. Egyptian officials have also refused to agree on the exact delineation of the cease-fire line.

Organization of American States

July 26—An O.A.S. report charges that Cuba is continuing to support guerrilla and terrorist activities in Venezuela.

Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS)

July 31—The first conference of the largely radical Communist OLAS opens in Havana.

United Nations

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

July 6—The Congolese representative charges before the Security Council that foreign European mercenaries are invading his country to prevent the carrying out of a progressive reform program.

July 7—The Security Council hears Congolese charges that rebel fighting in Kisangani is part of a plot to restore former Premier Moise Tshombe to power.

War in Vietnam

July 1—In Paris, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin declares that the issue of war or peace in Vietnam is up to the Vietnamese people and the Hanoi government "because they are the ones who are doing the fighting."

July 2—Informed sources in Washington report that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have told U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if General William Westmoreland does not receive the additional 70,000 troops he has requested, the U.S. may lose the initiative in the Vietnamese ground war.

July 7—U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara arrives in Saigon to confer with Westmoreland. The general reports that the U.S. is "slowly and steadily" winning the war but asserts that more troops are needed.

July 11—Secretary McNamara ends his 4-day Saigon visit after indicating he is determined to hold to a minimum the number of additional troops sent to Vietnam.

July 12—McNamara says that "some more" U.S. troops will be needed in Vietnam but not enough to necessitate a call-up of the reserves.

July 13—President Johnson holds a joint news conference with Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland and Chief of Staff General Earle Wheeler. The President says that all those present agree on rela-

tively modest increases of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

In a note delivered to the Soviet foreign ministry, the U.S. concedes the possibility that its planes could have damaged a Soviet freighter during June 29 raids on oil storage tanks near Haiphong. The U.S. pledges continuing efforts to avoid any such incidents.

July 15—The U.S. air base at Danang is hit by enemy rockets, killing 13 Americans, wounding 173 and destroying 17 planes.

The U.S. drops leaflets over North Vietnam offering 50 *taels* of gold (\$1,060) to any native who aids shot-down U.S. pilots to escape.

July 17—President Johnson sends a plea to the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam asking them to permit the impartial inspection of American prisoners and to return the seriously sick and wounded.

Casualty figures reveal that since the first of the year, the U.S. has lost 4,996 men killed in action and South Vietnam, 5,562. But since May 1, more Americans than South Vietnamese troops have been killed.

July 20—General Maxwell Taylor and Clark Clifford are named by President Johnson to visit Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and South Korea to discuss the possibility of another meeting of heads of states. The possibility of securing more troops from these nations for Vietnam may also be discussed.

July 22—It is revealed in Washington that the U.S. is planning a 50 per cent increase in the number of American advisers assigned to South Vietnam combat units.

July 25—In the first such coordinated action of the war, U.S. navy jet bombers and guns from the Seventh Fleet knock out a major North Vietnam thermal power plant.

July 26—For the first time since April, 1967, bombers strike just north of the demilitarized zone.

July 29—A barrage of mortar and rocket fire hits two U.S. army bases 15 and 29

miles north of Saigon. These are the war's closest rocket attacks to the capital.

An accidental fire disables the U.S. aircraft carrier *Forrestal* in the Tonkin Gulf. (See *U.S., Military.*)

ALGERIA

July 1—The former premier of the Congo, Moise Tshombe, is kidnapped after his private plane is hijacked over the Mediterranean and flown to Algeria. Tshombe is under a death sentence in the Congo for "high treason."

July 4—Congoese Attorney General Alidor Kabeya arrives in Algiers to arrange for extradition of Tshombe.

July 21—The Algerian Supreme Court agrees to extradite Moise Tshombe.

ANGUILLA

July 12—A formal declaration of independence is proclaimed following yesterday's referendum vote showing 1,813 in favor and 5 opposed to secession from the St. Kitts Federation.

July 31—Officials in Anguilla agree to return to the federation after a 2-month secession.

AUSTRIA

July 11—Austria moves two army battalions to the Alpine border to halt the movement of terrorists into Italy from the Austrian Tyrol. The cabinet also strongly assails Italy's declared intention of blocking Austria's projected association with the European Common Market unless terrorist activities stop. Vice Chancellor Fritz Bock says Italy is unjustified in linking the two issues.

BOLIVIA

July 4—It is revealed that the government has requested Argentina to send ground troops into Bolivian territory to help fight major guerrilla forces. Reliable sources say the request has been rejected "for the time being."

CANADA(See also *France*)

- July 1—Queen Elizabeth II addresses members of Parliament and advises Canadians to make their second century “another great voyage” for national unity.
- July 23—French President Charles de Gaulle arrives in Quebec and is cheered by hundreds when he hails the affinity of French Canada with France.
- July 24—Speaking in Montreal, President de Gaulle shouts the French Canadian separatist slogan, “long live free Quebec,” before a cheering crowd of 10,000.
- July 25—Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson terms de Gaulle’s statements “unacceptable to the Canadian people and its government.”
- July 26—President de Gaulle cancels his scheduled trip to Ottawa and his meeting with the Canadian prime minister and flies back to Paris.

CHILE

- July 1—Police and armed forces take over postal and telegraph services to break a 10-day nationwide strike.
- July 11—The leaders of the ruling Christian Democratic party declare that guerrilla warfare against governments that “ignore the people’s rights and offer no electoral solution” is a legitimate action. It says that the Latin American Solidarity Organization, supported by Cuba, may operate freely in Chile if it does not support insurgency.
- July 16—President Eduardo Frei signs a land reform bill designed to give a million landless peasants small plots within five years.
- July 21—Following a 14.7 per cent rise in the cost of living in the past six months, price controls, chiefly on industrial products, go into effect.

**CHINA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
(Communist)**

- July 1—Peking rejects a Burmese demand that the Chinese government put a halt

to anti-Burmese demonstrations in China.

July 4—Peking charges that “thousands” of Chinese students have been arrested and detained in Burma and demands that Rangoon grant prompt exit visas to wounded Chinese.

July 7—Peking announces the discontinuance of its \$84-million aid program to Burma. It also calls on the Indonesian people to overthrow the “fascist regime” of General Suharto and pledges “resolute support” for the Indonesian Communist party.

July 21—In Hong Kong, the first secretary of the Communist party in Yunnan is reported to have committed suicide as the influence of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution spreads in southwest China.

July 22—Reports from Peking indicate that last week two top leaders of Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s Cultural Revolution were arrested in Wuhan.

July 23—The two reportedly kidnapped Maoist aides return to Peking. About 500 army trucks roll through Peking, each carrying placards denouncing the head of the military district of Wuhan.

July 28—The government radio reports that Maoist forces have regained control of Wuhan.

Right-wing Hong Kong newspapers report that between 100 and 500 persons have been killed in recent fighting in Canton.

July 31—According to United Press International in Hong Kong, yesterday Peking radio disclosed that the Chinese Communist Army was undergoing extreme purges to bring the army under the control of Maoist forces.

**CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE
(Kinshasa)**(See also *Algeria*)

July 5—President Joseph D. Mobutu declares a state of emergency after two unidentified planes land “foreign mercenaries” in Kisangani, the former Stanleyville.

July 6—The government reports that loyal

troops are fighting rebellious Congolese soldiers and foreign mercenaries in Kisan-gani and Bukavu. The Kinshasa radio says a 200-man unit of French, Belgian, Italian and Spanish volunteers serving with the Congolese army has joined forces with foreign paratroopers.

July 7—The government reports that loyal army forces have recaptured Kisangani and Bukavu.

July 9—In response to a request from President Mobutu, the U.S. dispatches three military transport planes to ferry Congolese troops and military supplies to staging points in the eastern Congo.

July 12—The state of emergency is lifted in all but two eastern provinces. The Red Cross is working to evacuate 150 white foreign nationals, including 20 Americans, being held by mercenary forces in Kisan-gani.

July 13—The rebellion in the eastern Congo appears to have ended as 180 white mercenaries who held the Kisangani airport for eight days break out of an army encirclement and flee toward the southeast in 25 trucks.

July 14—Civilians and Congolese soldiers clash in Kisangani. At the request of the Red Cross, a U.S. air force plane lands at Kisangani to evacuate white civilians.

CYPRUS

July 28—The House of Representatives unanimously extends President Makarios' term for another year because "prevailing conditions do not permit holding elections."

July 29—Heavy fighting breaks out in the mixed Greek-Turkish village of Ayios Theodoros.

FRANCE

(See also *Canada and Germany, Federal Republic of*)

July 2—The third and final nuclear test of the 1967 series is completed in the Pacific.

July 12—The cabinet approves a measure giving all workers a share in the profits and

the ownership of French industry.

July 31—President de Gaulle says France will help French Canadians free themselves from Canada; he declares that the Cabinet approves this stand unanimously.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 4—The Bonn government officially protests a Korean round-up of 17 South Korean residents in 6 West German cities between June 16 and June 20. The Seoul secret police flew the students home as "enemies of national security."

July 7—Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger says West Germany must enter into a "thorough reappraisal" of its defense policy. The statement follows a cabinet decision for drastic cuts in the defense budget.

July 12—French President Charles de Gaulle confers in Bonn with Chancellor Kiesinger.

July 13—France and West Germany agree to establish a joint commission to discuss the "political and security" needs of their nations during the next decade. President de Gaulle says France and Germany cannot separate if they wish to avoid American dominance.

July 21—A high West German source says that last week Chancellor Kiesinger disagreed with General de Gaulle's estimate of the dangers of the predominance of the U.S. role in Europe.

July 28—Four former SS men receive jail sentences ranging from three years to life for their role in the murder of the Jewish population of Kolomea, Poland.

GHANA

July 8—The nation's currency, the *cedi*, is devalued by about one-third.

GREECE

July 12—The military regime revokes the citizenship of eight Greek expatriates and confiscates their property.

Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, foreign minister from 1956 to 1963, is arrested on

charges of violating a law forbidding unauthorized gatherings of more than five persons.

HAITI

July 31—*The New York Times* states that July 30 reports from Haiti announced that an unexplained 10 P.M. to 5 A.M. curfew was imposed on July 29. This was accompanied by an intensified military guard around President François Duvalier's palace.

INDIA

July 29—The Congress party loses control of one of India's 17 states as the Madhya Pradesh government resigns after being defeated in the assembly.

IRAQ

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

July 10—President Abdel Rahman Arif relinquishes his post as prime minister and names Lieutenant General Taher Yahya to the position.

July 28—Prime Minister Taher Yahya announces a program putting the country on a virtual war footing with the avowed intention of resuming the war with Israel.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

July 31—Four Arab political leaders are banished from Jerusalem; they are charged with "incitement to subversion" against Israel.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

July 11—Premier Saad Jumaa appeals to all business enterprises not to lay off workers. The country faces a politically dangerous unemployment rate because of the Israeli seizure of Jordanian territory and the influx of 200,000 Palestinian refugees.

July 13—King Hussein begins extensive reorganization of the army.

July 25—King Hussein announces a sweeping program to give military training to those not now in the 50,000-man army.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*)

July 1—President Chung Hee Park begins a second 4-year term.

July 8—South Korea's Central Intelligence Agency says it has arrested about 70 members of a Communist espionage ring organized by North Korean officials in East Berlin beginning in 1958. Among those arrested were 16 students brought home from West Germany, eight from France, and one each from the U.S. and Austria.

MEXICO

July 2—The Institutional Revolutionary party continues its 3-decade dominance of Mexican politics as it wins 177 of 178 congressional seats.

July 19—The government officially reports it has halted a plot financed by Communist China to establish a "popular socialist" regime in Mexico. Thirteen are arrested.

NIGERIA

July 7—The first fighting is reported since the Eastern Region declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra May 30. The government announces that federal troops have invaded the seceding region.

July 14—After a week of fighting, the key rebel town of Nsukka is captured.

July 15—The government issues a decree establishing its control of all petroleum storage, transportation and distribution facilities. Despite the embargo on oil exports from the Eastern Region (from which Nigeria receives its refined oil), the government says there is no danger yet of oil rationing.

July 20—Civilians arriving at hospitals in Enugu, capital of the Eastern Region, report that the killing of civilians is increasing in areas overrun by the federal Nigerian troops.

July 26—The government reports the capture of the port of Bonny on the southern coast of the Eastern Region.

July 28—Federal troops, landed by sea to capture Biafra's major oil terminal of Bonny, now command the entire sea coast of the Eastern Region.

July 31—The government of Biafra announces it is seizing installations of the Shell-British Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria for the company's protection; early in July, the company offered the Eastern government a token payment of its quarterly royalty payment of \$19.5 million.

RUMANIA

July 15—Nicolae Ceausescu, first secretary of the Communist party, announces a major shake-up of the secret police, accusing it of having abused citizens' rights and of trying to exercise the political functions of the Communist party. A Council of State Security is formed to supervise police actions.

July 25—Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer makes a major address attacking interference in the relations between Communist countries. Alluding to the Soviet Union, he suggests that such interference is taking place.

SPAIN

July 22—The *Cortes* (parliament) approves a bill increasing the membership of and giving new duties to the future Council of the Realm.

SUDAN, THE

July 3—The government claims that 6,000 Ethiopian troops have penetrated about 30 miles into the eastern Sudan. In a strong protest, the government calls on Ethiopia to withdraw its troops.

July 4—Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub, attending the special U.N. General Assembly, denies reports that 6,000 Ethiopians have invaded the Sudan. He says

that 150 Ethiopian soldiers, not 6,000, entered the Fashaga area.

TURKEY

July 25—Pope Paul VI arrives in Istanbul, the first visit to the city by a Roman Catholic Pope since 711 A.D. The Pope and Athenagoras I, the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch, join in prayers for world peace and pledge to work toward eventual reunion of the two churches.

July 26—Pope Paul ends his Turkish visit after conferring with President Cevdet Sunay on the Middle East conflict.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

July 9—The government "postpones indefinitely" a 10-week U.S. tour by more than 200 performers, including Bolshoi Ballet stars. This is the first time the government has canceled a visit by its performers since the cultural exchange agreement went into effect in 1958.

July 16—Official figures are released showing that all branches of industry significantly exceeded production plans in the first half of 1967. Consumer goods showed a 12 per cent increase over last year. The growth of overall industrial output is put at 10.6 per cent.

July 27—Following 15 weeks of bargaining, the Soviet Union and Communist China sign a trade agreement. No details are given.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis, and Yemen*)

July 21—President Gamal Abdel Nasser names Amin Howeidi as the new war minister.

July 25—A new austerity budget is announced to increase taxes and the prices of consumer goods. The budget is designed to offset foreign currency losses due to the Suez Canal closing, a lack of tourist trade, and

loss of oil and mineral resources in the Sinai Peninsula.

UNITED KINGDOM, THE

July 4—The House of Commons takes final action approving a bill to repeal all criminal penalties for homosexual acts committed in private by consenting adults.

July 5—Defense Minister Denis Healey tells the Commons that France has withdrawn from the joint V-G military aircraft project for financial reasons. Britain has termed the new aircraft the "core" of her future air plans.

July 12—Commons approves a bill empowering the government for one year to delay wage and price increases by up to seven months.

July 14—Taking final action, Commons approves a measure to reform the abortion laws.

July 18—The government announces plans to withdraw from its Singapore and Malaysian bases in the mid-1970's.

July 20—The Labor Ministry reveals that July unemployment reached a 27-year high.

July 26—Home Secretary Roy Jenkins announces that the Race Relations Act will be extended to deal with racial job discrimination.

July 28—Nationalization of 14 companies, comprising 90 per cent of Britain's steel production, is completed.

British Territories

Hong Kong (Crown Colony)

July 8—Policemen are attacked by Chinese Communist rifle and automatic fire at the border town of Shataukok. After 5 police are killed and 12 wounded, an armored column of Gurkha troops of the British army is sent in to patrol the border.

July 9—Four persons are killed as Communist demonstrators clash with policemen on Hong Kong Island.

July 10—New violence breaks out as Communists kill a trolley driver and assault a bus driver in moves to intimidate strike-breaking transport workers.

July 12—Following three nights of riots, a curfew is imposed.

July 13—Security forces stage a pre-dawn attack on a suspected center of terrorism and agitation as they raid the offices of the Dock Workers Union.

July 15—A second suspected center of insurrection activities is raided as police search a Communist-controlled school.

Communist newspapers in Hong Kong call on supporters of Communist China to wage a "bloody fight to the end" against the British authorities.

July 16—Over 500 are arrested in raids on union establishments.

July 21—It is announced that Police Commissioner Edward Tyler is retiring "for health reasons" at his own request. Deputy Commissioner Edward Eates is appointed acting commissioner.

South Arabia, Federation of

July 5—British troops reoccupy the entire Arab district of Crater, from which they were forced to withdraw June 20 when anti-British terrorists staged a revolt.

Hassan Ali Bayoomi, minister of information and leader of the moderate Adeni National party, becomes South Arabia's first prime minister.

July 7—Prime Minister Bayoomi says that army officers will have seats in the caretaker government he is establishing. He is also negotiating "with all political groups and parties" to bring them into the government.

Tonga (Protectorate)

July 4—Coronation ceremonies take place to install King Taufaahau Tupon IV.

UNITED STATES, THE

Civil Rights

(See *Race Relations*)

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis; Congo and Yemen*)

July 6—President Johnson announces an agreement with Mexico to construct and operate an international flood control project for the Tijuana River.

July 10—Eight liberal Republican congressmen propose a plan for mutual deescalation in the Vietnamese war.

Both Democratic and Republican senatorial leaders attack the Administration for sending three military transport planes and supporting personnel to help the Congo put down a rebellion.

July 11—Secretary of State Dean Rusk says U.S. military planes were sent to the Congo as a political gesture to dispel a mounting tide of anti-white feeling.

Michigan's Governor George Romney calls for a deescalation of bombing of North Vietnam.

Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the Senate majority leader, warns that a third world war may be "already incubating in the ever-deepening struggle in Southeast Asia." He doubts that much progress has been made by U.S. troops toward winning the war.

July 13—President Johnson declares there is an "urgent need" for Israel to allow a "maximum number" of Arab refugees in Jordan to return to their homes.

July 17—State Department officials tell the House Banking and Currency Committee that arms sales to Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Asia are necessary to prevent the extension of Soviet or Chinese domination in this field.

July 26—The Administration defeats an effort in the House to force a congressional investigation of government arms sales.

July 27—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee votes to place restrictions on U.S. arms sales to underdeveloped nations.

The State Department says the U.S. is "deeply disturbed" by reported use of poison gas in Yemen by Egyptian forces.

sentative Edwin Willis (D., La.), charges that the Communist party has been involved in the "great majority" of protests against the Vietnamese war.

July 5—The Federal Communications Commission orders the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to reduce its long-distance and international telephone rates by an average of 3 per cent.

July 6—The Justice Department makes public the new regulations on federal wiretapping issued June 16 by Attorney General Ramsey Clark, forbidding all wiretapping and virtually all eavesdropping by federal agents except in cases of national security.

July 12—Senator Robert Kennedy (D., N.Y.) introduces a bill to create jobs for the unemployed and unskilled in city slums by attracting private plants to operate in the city areas. He criticizes much of the present antipoverty program as "ineffective, inefficient and degrading."

July 13—Robert Kennedy introduces a measure to attract private investors to rehabilitate or replace 400,000 substandard housing units in the nation's slums.

The Senate Judiciary Committee questions Supreme Court appointee Thurgood Marshall at length about his views on defendants' rights.

July 17—Congress passes and the President signs emergency legislation ordering an end to the nationwide railway strike for 90 days. A special board is to mediate the issues and impose settlement terms if no agreement is reached.

A measure to renew the charter of the Export-Import Bank is delayed in the House Banking and Currency Committee. Controversy arises over the role of the bank in financing Defense Department arms sales to foreign countries.

July 19—The House passes and sends to the Senate a measure making it a federal crime to use interstate facilities or cross state lines to incite a riot.

Southern senators on the Judiciary Committee continue their week-long questioning of Supreme Court appointee Thurgood Marshall.

Government

July 3—The chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Repre-

July 20—A \$40-million Administration bill to eliminate rats from city slums is defeated in the House.

July 21—Acting on a request of the Justice Department, a U.S. court of appeals temporarily blocks the proposed merger of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and the American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

Treasury officials reveal that the deficit in the government's ordinary administrative budget for fiscal year 1967 was \$9.9 billion, the second largest since World War II.

Labor

July 5—Workers at the world's largest shipyard, at Newport News, Virginia, go on strike because of union dissatisfaction with job classification and lack of incentive pay.

July 11—Heavily armed police and state troopers patrol Newport News after a major labor riot.

July 12—At new contract talks with General Motors, the United Automobile Workers outlines its plans for a guaranteed annual wage.

July 15—In a dispute over wage provisions in a new contract, 37,000 copper workers in four major companies go on strike.

July 16—A strike by members of the International Association of Machinists shuts down 28 railroad lines. President Johnson asks Congress for legislation to end the walkout. (See also *U.S., Government.*)

July 18—Following the passage of legislation providing for compulsory mediation, the railroad strike ends. President Johnson names Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.) as chairman of a special five-man board to mediate the dispute.

July 28—The U.A.W. presents General Motors with a position paper stating that the demand for profit sharing is to be added to other desired contract improvements.

Military

July 11—A private research study sponsored

by the House Armed Services Committee reports that the Soviet Union will have a major nuclear superiority over the U.S. by 1971 unless steps are taken this year to improve U.S. nuclear capabilities.

July 21—The U.S. Court of Military Appeals instructs the Judge Advocate General to investigate charges that an army base commander influenced his officers to impose heavy sentences in court-martial trials.

July 27—An army captain is found innocent of having ordered the death of a suspected Vietcong prisoner. Three enlisted men have been convicted of having killed the Vietcong prisoner; they say they acted on the captain's orders.

July 31—The fire-scarred *Forrestal* arrives in Subic Bay in the Philippines. It was reported yesterday that there were 71 killed, 78 injured and 112 missing after the fire of July 29, the worst U.S. naval disaster since World War II. Twenty-nine jet fighters were destroyed. (See also *Intl, War in Vietnam.*)

Politics

July 31—Michigan's Governor George Romney charges that the President "played politics" during the Detroit riots.

Race Relations

July 4—James Meredith ends his 162-mile "march against fear" through Mississippi.

July 5—At its national convention, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) votes to eliminate the word "multiracial" from its constitutional description of membership.

July 10—Addressing the national convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Executive Director Roy Wilkins assails congressional backers of a proposed anti-riot bill. He asserts that legislators opposing civil rights legislation are "creating the atmosphere" for racial violence.

July 11—Martin Luther King announces nationwide application of "Operation Breadbasket," a program of economic pressure

concerns for jobs for ghetto

which will start promptly in 42

ities.

July 12—Violence erupts in Newark, New Jersey, following the arrest of a Negro cab driver.

July 13—A second night of racial violence occurs in Newark.

Racial violence with looting and vandalism breaks out in Hartford, Connecticut.

The Ford Foundation makes a \$175,000 grant to CORE to help improve racial relations and opportunities for Cleveland Negroes.

July 14—N.J. Governor Richard Hughes calls out the National Guard as violence mounts in Newark. He declares the city in "criminal insurrection."

July 16—The mayor of Plainfield, New Jersey, asks for state troops after two days of riots.

In Des Moines, Iowa, a large crowd of Negroes go on a rock and bottle throwing rampage; two persons are injured and 17 arrested.

July 17—Hughes announces that "the rioting and looting are over"; the National Guard and state troopers leave Newark. The five days of rioting leave 26 dead, 1,200 injured, 1,300 arrested and \$15 million in property damage.

July 18—Federal agents arrest 12 white men in Salisbury, North Carolina and charge them with a 21-month campaign of terror to prevent school integration in two counties.

July 19—The National Guard is called out in Cairo, Illinois, after three nights of racial violence.

Hughes names a "blue ribbon" panel to investigate the causes of recent riots and to investigate charges that state troopers engaged in indiscriminate shooting during the riots.

July 20—A four-day conference on Black Power opens in Newark, with 400 delegates representing the 45 civil rights groups.

July 21—National Guard troops are ordered into Minneapolis to help curb increasing

violence in the Negro section.

Leaders of the National Conference on Black Power reject the idea that Negroes are responsible for preventing violence in the cities. Floyd McKissick, chairman of CORE, declares that "white people control the government, the money and the ghettos."

July 24—National Guard troops are ordered into a Negro section of Detroit after widespread looting, vandalism and sniping.

Violence breaks out between Puerto Ricans and police in New York City's Spanish Harlem.

A series of resolutions is adopted by the first National Conference on Black Power, including calls for Negroes to boycott the Olympic competitions and professional boxing, and moderate Negro churches.

President Lyndon Johnson orders 4,700 army paratroopers to the Detroit area.

The Republican Coordinating Committee charges that the President must share some of the blame for the present situation in which the nation is "rapidly approaching a state of anarchy."

July 25—Following two days of riots in East Harlem, New York's Mayor John Lindsay appeals to Puerto Ricans to stay home and to keep their children off the streets.

After two days of rioting, National Guard troops are ordered to Toledo, Ohio.

Two Negroes are killed in Pontiac, Michigan, as looting and vandalism erupts there as well as in Flint and Grand Rapids.

The F.B.I. begins a search for H. Rap Brown, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.). He is formally charged with inciting a riot in Cambridge, Maryland, where major violence occurs after he urged a Negro audience to "burn this town down."

Martin Luther King says he supports the use of federal troops to help end the Detroit rioting.

July 26—As the Detroit violence intensifies and riots erupt in Chicago and Cincinnati, 4 national civil rights leaders appeal to Negroes to "end mob rule." Martin

Luther King, A. Philip Randolph; Roy Wilkins and Whitney M. Young, Jr., warn that violence is self-destructive for Negroes, who are the "primary victims of the riots."

Adam Clayton Powell declares that riots "are a necessary phase of the black revolution."

H. Rap Brown is arrested.

July 27—In a speech broadcast nationwide, President Johnson recommends long-term remedial programs to attack the root causes of rioting. He creates an Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate the riots and make recommendations.

Major rioting and arson erupt in Cincinnati, and South Bend, Indiana.

Senator Thruston Morton (R., Ky.) says the Republican party was "irresponsible" in blaming President Johnson for the nation's race riots.

July 28—Federal paratroopers are withdrawn from Detroit's major riot area. The nation's worst racial outbreak leaves 39 dead, more than 1,000 injured, 5,000 arrested, and property damage estimated at \$600 million.

In Cuba, former head of S.N.C.C. Stokely Carmichael calls for racial guerrilla warfare in New York and Detroit.

July 29—The 11-member Commission on Civil Disorders, chaired by Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, holds its first meeting. President Johnson tells the group it must prepare an interim report by March 1, 1968.

July 30—President Johnson's representative in Detroit, Cyrus R. Vance, announces that the federal paratroopers are being withdrawn from Detroit today.

July 31—A round-the-clock curfew quiets Milwaukee after a night of rioting.

President Johnson names Washington lawyer David Ginsburg as executive director of his special Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

continuation of the island's status as an autonomous commonwealth associated with the U.S.

VATICAN, THE

(See also *Turkey*)

July 17—Vatican sources report that Pope Paul VI has ordered the abrogation of the oath against modernism that priests and ecclesiastical officials have had to take since 1910.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Vietnam*)

July 1—The Constituent Assembly approves 17 presidential candidates, including Major General Duong Van Minh, an exiled former chief of state. Also approved is the slate supported by the present military junta, headed by Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu, with Premier Nguyen Cao Ky as his running mate.

July 5—The ruling military junta files a petition with the Constituent Assembly urging that Au Truong Thanh be eliminated from the ballot "because he is a Communist." Thanh is running on a platform calling for an immediate cease-fire.

July 18—The Constituent Assembly removes seven candidates from the presidential race, including General Minh and Thanh.

July 21—The number of candidates in the September 3 senatorial elections is reduced from 640 to 480 by a special screening committee. Among those eliminated are two candidates allied with Thich Tri Quang, a radical Buddhist monk who led an anti-government movement in 1966.

YEMEN

July 24—Prince Hassan Ben Hussein charges that on six occasions in the past three months the Egyptians have used poison gas against Royalist troops, killing 525 troops and civilians.

Territories

Puerto Rico

July 23—Voters overwhelmingly approve a

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